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RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 
 
 NAOMI CAHN AND JUNE CARBONE* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American family law has fractured. Prior waves of family law reform – 
no fault divorce, marital property regimes, the dismantling of distinctions 
associated with illegitimacy, child support enforcement -- have swept through 
the country, and over time (and often a not very long time) produced a 
remarkable degree of consensus about the core of family law.1  Continued 
consensus, however, appears to be at an end.  Central issues on the regulation of 
sexuality, exemplified by abortion, control of teen sexuality, and federal and 
state governments’ “marriage promotion” efforts have split the country,2 raising 
anew the question of what federalism means in the context of family law.   
 
This article shows that the current family values debate is particularly 
intractable not just because the different family law regimes rest on different 
paradigms, but because what we identify as “blue families” and “red families” 
are living different lives, with different moral imperatives.  While legal scholars 
acknowledge the intractability of the values debate, they have not acknowledged 
the central role of family law – and of the divergent family paradigms 
underlying it.3   These unacknowledged differences contribute to a sense of 
                                                          
*   Naomi Cahn is the John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School.  June Carbone is the Edward A. Smith-Missouri Professor of Law, the 
Constitution and Society  at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.  The authors thank Jane 
Curry, Bradley Joondeph, Nancy Levit, and Carol Sanger for their generous comments on the 
manuscript 
1 During a twenty-year period from 1965 to 1985, for example, every state in the country 
adopted some method for dissolving a marriage without a showing of fault.  See Herma Hill 
Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family 
Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2064 (2000).  
2 The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy and the dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg in the 
Supreme Court’s partial-birth abortion case dramatically illustrate these divisions.  See Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
3 Robert Post and Reva Siegal, for example, acknowledge the connection between Protestant 
Fundamentalist opposition to abortion and changing gender roles, and demonstrate that abortion 
did not become a rallying cry for the Protestant right until it became part of broader-based 
values movement in the eighties.   Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash,__ HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968.  William Eskridge further explores 
the polarizing effect of same-sex marriage, and its particular divisiveness in more religious parts 
of the country.  William N. Eskridge, Body Politics:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of 
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005).   While these scholars acknowledge 
different family values behind the political differences, they do not explore the role of different 
family systems in either producing different values or different legal imperatives. 
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“moral panic” that increases support for uncompromising positions and 
threatens to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary itself. 4  We 
believe that the first step in preserving the integrity of family law decision-
making is recognition that two different legal regimes exist. 
  
     “Blue states,” that is, the states that voted Democratic in the 2004 
presidential election,5 have moved toward a new family model.  Blue families 
are characterized by greater wealth, higher average levels of education, greater 
urbanization, lower fertility levels, and lower levels of church attendance.6   
They have been among the first to embrace a new family model, which we term 
“the new middle class morality,” that responds to the post-industrial economy 
by delaying childbearing and investing in the educational and workplace 
opportunities of both men and women.7       
 
To realize the advantages that have come with increased specialization 
among women, the new model involves less control of sexuality, celebrates 
more egalitarian gender roles, and promotes financial independence and 
emotional maturity as the sine qua non of responsible parenthood.  The 
hallmarks of the new system’s success are lower rates of divorce and teen births; 
its weaknesses may ultimately be falling fertility and high percentages of the 
population living alone.  In this new model, abstinence is unrealistic, 
contraception is not only permissible, but morally compelled, and abortion is the 
necessary (and responsible) fallback.  Non-marital cohabitation is irrelevant to 
child custody determinations absent an immediate impact on the child, but 
domestic violence is a serious threat to family integrity that requires state 
intervention.   Recognition of same-sex relationships is a matter of basic 
equality.8  
 
The “red states,” that is, the states that voted Republican in the last 
presidential election, have not just lagged in adjusting to the new model, but 
they are increasingly saying “no” to its imperatives.   Most prominently in the 
mountain west, the rural plains, and the South, these states continue to 
emphasize a more traditional family system that celebrates marriage as the 
institution ordained to promote the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing.  
This traditional system, in tandem with religious teachings about sin and guilt, 
                                                          
4 See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture Of Life, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 753, 789 (2006) (defining “moral panic”). 
5 In using the “red state,” “blue state” terminology, we are not taking a position on the debate 
ranging in political science as to whether or not the culture wars are a myth.  Compare MORRIS 
P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A 
POLARIZED AMERICA (2004) with Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, Why Can’t We All Just 
Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America, 3 THE FORUM 1 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art1.   
6 See infra Section __ for further discussion of  blue families.   
7 For a fuller account of these changes, see JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS:  THE 
SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000). 
8 We comprehensively develop this model at notes  , infra. 
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places a premium on the control of sexuality.9  As a result, it encourages 
marriage relatively soon after (if not before) the beginning of sexual activity, 
identifies responsible childbearing with family form rather than economic self-
sufficiency or emotional maturity, and embraces more authoritarian models of 
parenting and the state -- both should be able and willing to intervene to 
promote the “right” moral values.   Within red families, abstinence outside of 
marriage is a moral imperative, the shotgun marriage is the preferred solution to 
an improvident pregnancy, and socialization into traditional gender roles is 
critical to marital stability.10  Abortion is an abomination not only because it 
violates religious teachings about the beginning of life, but also because it 
represents a determination to evade the consequences of immoral conduct.  And 
gay marriage is, if anything, worse than abortion – the symbol of at the ability to 
flout moral teachings in the name of individualism and choice.11   
 
Both family models have problems.  The blue states have unprecedented 
numbers who will never marry, falling fertility rates and considerable concern 
about the lack of commitment within intimate relationships.12  Moreover, their 
largest challenge may be the inequality the system produces between the 
children who enjoy the advantages of intact, two income families and those of 
the increasingly marginalized poor.13   Red state families, however, are in crisis 
on their own terms.  Although voters in red states care profoundly about 
morality and marriage, red states have the highest divorce rates in the country.14  
Although red states have the lowest abortion rates, their teens are also more 
likely to become pregnant and to give birth to children the parents are ill-
equipped to raise.15  Red states are poorer and the resources available to cushion 
the consequences of family fragility may be dramatically less.16  Given the 
                                                          
9 Attitudes toward premarital sexuality differ considerably.  While 93% of all Americans, 
accordingly to a 2003 Gallup poll, believe that extramarital sex is morally wrong, with little 
variation among political groups, there are dramatic differences with respect to premarital sex:  
only 42% of self-identified conservatives compared to 80% of self-identified liberals believe 
that premarital sex is morally acceptable.  George H. Gallup, Jr., Current Views on Premarital, 
Extramarital Sex, GALLUP POLL, June 24, 2003.  There is similar variation on the importance of 
marriage.  In a 2006 poll, almost twice as many conservatives (85%) as liberals (43%) believe 
that marriage is extremely important if the couple plans to stay together for life.  Lydia Saad, 
Americans Have Complex Relationship with Marriage, GALLUP POLL, May 30, 2006.   
10 See W. Bradford Wilcox and Steven L. Nock, What’s Love Got To Do With It?  Equality, 
Equity, Commitment and Women’s Marital Quality, 84 SOC. FORCES 1321 (2006), 
http://www.virginia.edu/sociology/peopleofsociology/wilcoxpapers/Wilcox%20Nock%20marria
ge.pdf   
11 For a comprehensive examination of the red state position, see notes  infra. 
12 In Europe, which has largely adopted a blue state model, fertility is a much bigger source of 
concern than divorce or non-marital sexuality.  See e.g., Simona Bignami-Van Assche and 
Francesco C. Billari, Pathways to Adulthood and Fertility: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and 
Québec (2006), http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=60342. 
13 See discussion infra at ___. 
14 See the chart in Appendix B. 
15 See discussion infra at notes ___. 
16 See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, __ W. 
VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)(manuscript on file with authors). 
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inherent difficulties of controlling sexual behavior and the atrophy of the social 
forces that historically stigmatized non-marital births and coerced unhappy 
couples to stay together, the red states must either increase their efforts to 
reinstill the right values or give up the fight.17   They have accordingly sounded 
a call to arms.   
  
A large component of the determination to affirm the “right” values is 
symbolic.  Despite the continued existence of laws making fornication and 
adultery crimes, prosecutions are rare. 18  And the Supreme Court has 
invalidated the laws in the one arena most likely to receive prosecutorial 
attention – consensual sodomy between same-sex partners.19   The more intense 
fights come over the extension of state approval to traditionally “sinful” acts:  
abstinence education in public schools (with education about contraception 
implying acceptance of non-marital sexuality), abortion and same-sex marriage, 
and non-marital cohabitation in custody conflicts.20   These issues go to the core 
of the values divide.   
 
    We believe that the social and legal conflicts over these issues are so 
intense, not just because the opposing views are on a collision course, but 
because the lives of red families and blue families intersect their respective 
family systems at different stages in the life cycle with different symbolic and 
practical needs.  Two primary demographic factors distinguish red families from 
blue ones.  The first is age. The average age of marriage in the United States as a 
whole is now 25 for women and near 27 for men.  In Massachusetts, among the 
bluest of blue states, it is 27 for women and 29 for men.  In Utah, the average 
woman marries before she turns 22, the average man before 24.21  Yet, full 
physical and mental maturity does not take place until the mid-twenties, and 
marriage before the age of twenty-five is a significant risk factor for divorce.  
Testosterone levels peak around age 25, and the impulsive behavior and risk-
taking associated with late adolescence does not begin to stabilize until the mid-
                                                          
17 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM (2003) (documenting the decline in 
stigma associated with non-marital births and divorce and calling for the revitalization of the 
commitment to marriage). 
18 The Court in Lawrence v. Texas noted that, historically, the states outlawed non-procreative 
sex even between married couples.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003).  Prosecutors, 
however, generally chose not to prosecute private acts between consenting adults, and the law 
treated the testimony of a consenting adult partner as the testimony of an accomplice, and 
therefore inadmissible.  Id. (“Under then-prevailing standards, a man could not be convicted of 
sodomy upon testimony of a consenting partner, because the partner was considered an 
accomplice.  A partner’s testimony, however, was admissible if he or she had not consented to 
the act or was a minor, and therefore incapable of consent”). 
19 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
20  See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL:  WARRING VIEWS ON SEX -- AND SEX 
EDUCATION -- SINCE THE SIXTIES 156 (2006). 
21 Infoplease, Median Age at First Marriage, INFORMATION PLEASE DATABASE (2007), 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html. 
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twenties. 22   Delayed marriage, however, requires addressing sexuality on terms 
other than abstinence, and marriage before full emotional and financial maturity 
requires a level of support no longer available for large parts of the population.23   
 
    The second demographic factor exacerbating values conflicts is church 
attendance.  Religious differences such as the historic divisions between 
Catholics and Protestants are less a factor in family law than the intensity of 
religious practices.24   Moreover, church attendance correlates not just with 
different views about sexual morality, but also with a different orientation 
toward authority.  Regular church-goers appear to be more comfortable, for 
example, with the use of force over diplomacy, authoritarian leadership styles, 
state intervention in family life, and stricter parenting styles.  As a result, they 
do not just hold different views on issues such as the acceptability of non-
marital cohabitation or homosexuality; they also respond to different arguments 
and start with different assumptions about the role of the state.  These views, 
which once may have commanded consensus support in the United States as a 
whole, may no longer do so even within conservative, if not evangelical, 
communities.25   
 
   These differences in worldviews, beliefs, and lived experiences pose 
particularly sharp challenges for family law.  Scholars debate the level of 
political polarization in the United States, and all scholars acknowledge that 
                                                          
22.See Craig M. Bennett and Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult 
Brain:  A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, __ HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING __ (forthcoming 
2007), http://theteenbrain.com/about/publications/pdfs/2005-Bennett-VBM.pdf; Elizabeth Scott 
and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003).   For an examination of 
the relationship between complex legal issues and teen-agers’ rights, see Laura Rosenbury, 
Between Home and School, 155 PA. L. REV. 833 (2007); Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes:  
Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 427 (2000).    
23 This means that the paradigm red state couple enters marriage not long after the woman 
becomes sexually active, has two children by her mid-twenties, and reaches the critical period of 
marriage at the high point in the life cycle for risk taking and experimentation.  The 
paradigmatic blue state couple is more likely to experiment with multiple partners, postpone 
marriage until after they reach emotional and financial maturity, and have their children (if they 
have them at all) as their lives are stabilizing. If the parents do separate, they are better prepared 
to deal with the consequences.  If nothing else, they may be too exhausted to seek new partners 
if they still have young children as they approach forty.   For the full development of this model, 
see notes ___ infra and accompanying text. 
24 Nonetheless, sectarian differences have not disappeared as Catholics sermons continue to 
emphasize the immorality of abortion while Protestant churches place greater emphasis on the evils 
of homosexuality.  See infra at ______. 
25 Sociologist Kristin Luker, for example, in her in-depth study of sex education observes that 
conservatives view sex as sacred, while liberals view it as natural; conservatives view non-marital sex 
as wrong “because the Bible says it is,” while liberals view reach normative conclusions more 
instrumentally; and, unsurprisingly, conservative religious membership correlates with support for 
abstinence education while the less observant are more likely to reach decisions on the content of sex 
education based on its perceived effectiveness.   LUKER,  supra note ___, at 156.  
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states vary politically and demographically within their borders.26  Yet, issues of 
family cut much closer to core constituents of identity than economic or 
philosophical issues.27   Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel have recently 
argued, in their reinterpretation of the opposition to Roe v. Wade,28  that the 
perceived threat to the traditional family has been a primary concern motivating 
the activists of the new era – and those activists have staked out more extreme 
positions in the values debate.29  What Post and Siegel do not address is that the 
more radical positions, to the extent they define moderates as partisans, have the 
potential to undermine the integrity of the courts in the most profound and 
prosaic of family issues.  The Supreme Court may chose not to grant certiorari 
in the most difficult of abortion cases, family courts have much more difficulty 
finessing issues such as non-marital cohabitation.   
 
  This article examines the role of family law within a federal system at a 
time of cultural conflict.  Family law is, of course, primarily state law; it does 
not need to be uniform across the many states.  Nonetheless, state family law is 
also mediated by constitutional decisions, federal legislation, uniform acts and 
interstate transactions that transcend state boundaries.  The role of these 
bridging devices changes dramatically in an area in which the states are in 
fundamental disagreement on the purposes of family regulation.30   
 
 This Article first documents the divergence between the two family 
systems.  Second, it examines the demographic differences between red states 
and blue states.  Third, it considers the extent to which state laws differ, 
                                                          
26 For a summary of the extensive political science literature on these issues, see DELIA 
BALDASSARRI AND ANDREW GELMAN, PARTISANS WITHOUT CONSTRAINT: POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION AND TRENDS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, June 13, 2007, 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding 
polarization on moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on 
moral issues among the better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral 
issues increasing much more dramatically in since the mid-eighties) and EDWARD L. GLAESER 
AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD 
INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Discussion Paper No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that 
American political divisions have reverted to their pre-New Deal form, and have become 
increasingly religious and cultural).  See also John W. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes 
Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL 
J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA. (2004). 
27 William N. Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and 
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005). 
28 Robert Post and Reva Siegel,  Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,__ 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968 
29 See Evans, supra note __  (reviewing the data and concluding that “While political scientists 
have recently found less polarization among elected officials on economic issues, it seems clear 
that members of the public who are involved in politics are becoming polarized on moral 
issues.”). 
30 For a discussion of the relationship between family law and federalism, see ( Reva B. Siegel, She 
The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, And The Family, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 947 (2002); SYLVIA LAW, FAMILIES AND FEDERALSIM,  4 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y, 175 (2000).  
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examining three areas of contention: teen abortion statutes, same-sex marriage, 
and the role of non-marital sexuality in child custody decisionmaking.  Fourth, it 
discusses the legal strategies that can defuse rather than inflame these cultural 
differences, and evaluates the factors that might over time produce greater 
convergence – and the importance of courts in keeping the avenues of 
transformation open.  
 
  II.  CHANGING MORAL ASSUMPTION AND THE POLARIZATION OF FAMILY 
LAW  
 
 Family law lies at the intersection of public and private law.  Family 
governance, like other forms of private law, creates a framework for dispute 
resolution by establishing bright line statuses, default terms for adult 
partnerships, and mandatory provisions designed to safeguard children’s well-
being.31  Family law also serves, however, to promote societal interests by 
reinforcing public norms, “channeling” intimate behavior along socially 
approved pathways, and protecting children.32 
 
This channeling poses a challenge for a liberal democratic state.  On the 
one hand, the inculcation of societal norms involves the imposition of state 
mandated preferences on those who would choose other regimes.  On the other 
hand, democratic societies require the expression of values “that concern us and 
bind us together."33   The courts have historically justified the coercion intrinsic 
to the selection of one family regime over another on two grounds. First, they 
recognize what is often a high degree of societal consensus on moral values.   In 
upholding restrictions on polygamy in the nineteenth century, for example, the 
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the shared European roots on which the 
United States was founded.34  Second, the courts recognized the practical need 
to restrain sexuality in eras without effective contraception.  In a world of 
                                                          
31 See Margaret F. Brinig, BOOK REVIEW: STATUS, CONTRACT AND COVENANT: A Review 
of Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy by Milton C. Regan,Jr., 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994) 
(reviewing the importance of status as opposed to contract in family law). 
32 See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992); 
LinEvada C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:  Revising the Channelling Function of 
Family Law, 28 CARD. L. REV. 2133 (2007);  
33 ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE:  PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 286-87 (1989).  
Indeed, at the end of his life, libertarian Robert Nozick concluded that the libertarian position he 
had propounded was “seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the humane 
considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its fabric.”  He 
emphasized the “symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as 
a way of marking their importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, 
channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward them.” Id. 
34 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (“Polygamy has always been odious 
among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon 
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.”) 
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limited resources, notions of legitimacy and family morality served to order 
claims for the provision of support. 35 
 
In today’s world, the sense of shared values is frayed, and the need for 
triage in the allocation of resources less compelling.36  This in turn heightens the 
tension between individual expression and majoritarian norm creation.  
Consider, for example, the exchange between Kennedy and Scalia in Lawrence 
v. Texas. 37  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority that struck down the laws 
criminalizing same-sex sodomy, observed that the “issue is whether the majority 
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law.  ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of 
all, not to mandate our own moral code.’”38   Scalia’s scathing dissent accused 
the majority of “taking sides in the culture wars,” and suggested that Kennedy’s 
autonomy principle, applied to family creation, necessarily extends to state 
protection for individual choice in the constitution of marriage, parenthood, 
family relationships, childrearing and education.39   State promotion of shared 
norms, and state policed family statuses would give way to autonomy, privacy, 
and equality before the law.40 
 
  Unlike other scholars, we believe that the real challenge confronting 
family law is not the stark choice between values promotion and libertarian 
neutrality.  We suspect that Scalia is right that true neutrality is impossible, and 
we agree that the state benefits too greatly from shared understandings to 
abandon the enterprise. Instead, we see the issue as one of how to decide which 
values to promote, and how to make that choice in a time of polarization.  To 
address that issue, however, it is first necessary to consider why the family 
values debate has become so intense.  This section provides a concise history of 
the relationship between changes in family values  and social and economic 
norms.  Family values, even traditional family values, have never been static.  
The moral and practical reorganization of family understandings is tied to a 
changing society.41   Family composition is as much a way of ordering societal 
investment as commercial organization, and societal change does not play out 
evenly along lines of class, race, gender – or as we will argue here – region.   
Instead, the middle class leads in forging new moral understandings, and often 
                                                          
35 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW 
LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 30-31 (2005).  The appearance of shared consensus did not mean 
there were no contrary views, as, for example, shown by those who have rewritten gay legal 
history.  E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW:  CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
(1999). 
36 COONTZ, supra note  __; McClain, supra note __, at 2139; Barbara Stark , Marriage Proposals: 
From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law,  89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479 (2001). 
37 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
38 Id. at 571. 
39 Id. at 604 (emphasis in original). 
40   See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225 (1999); Jill 
Elaine Hasday , The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004).  
41 For a much fuller account, see CARBONE, supra note __, at  48-49; 63-66; 108-09. 
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the terms by which other groups are to be judged.42    
 
A.   Economic Transformation and the Renegotiation of Family Values 
 
  Two large scale economic transformations underlie the contemporary, and 
differing, approaches to family values:  the nineteenth century change from a 
rural agricultural economy to a more urban industrial one, and the late twentieth 
century shift from the industrial era to an information economy. 43 
 
 Both transformations redefined the relationship between home and market, 
and produced greater investment in children by delaying childbearing and 
reducing overall fertility.44  Both did so, at least in part, by redefining gender 
roles and by moving to counter overreliance on the shotgun marriage.  
Moreover, in both transformations, at least in the short term, changes in family 
organization exacerbated societal inequality as the wealthier middle class used 
the benefits of the new system to enhance its class standing.  The first 
transformation created a new middle class to staff the professions and 
managerial ranks of the industrial economy.  Critical to its success was greater 
investment in boys’ formal education, which required in turn postponing 
marriage and entry into the labor force.45   An important vehicle in producing 
that result was an emphasis on women’s purity and their greater agency in 
forging the new moral code.46  As women become more able and willing to say 
“no,”47 the number of brides who gave birth within eight and a half months of 
their wedding declined from 30% in 1800 to 10% by 1860, the average number 
                                                          
42 Id. 
43 Some scholars refer to this as the “first demographic transformation.”   See, e.g., Sara 
McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring After the Second Demographic 
Transformation, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 607 (2004).  For a discussion of the contemporary 
need for two-earners per family, see ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE 
TWO-INCOME TRAP:  WHY  MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS ARE GOING BROKE (2004). 
44 CARBONE, supra note _, at 62-63. 
45 Id. at 107-110. 
46 The economic changes have been accompanied by what Joan Williams has termed the 
ideology of domesticity, which focused on the “separate spheres” of home and market and 
produced the “cult of true womanhood.”  JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY 
AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
47 See Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'":  A 
Feminist Rethinking Of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 388 (1993) (“Victorian culture 
exalted sexual restraint and designated women as caretakers of society's sexual virtue.”).  Larson 
also notes, however, that: “Although the Victorian convention of female sexual modesty 
repressed women's sexuality, it also strengthened women's social authority and dignity, 
empowering women to resist male sexual demands and thus shifting the balance of power 
between men and women in the private sphere.”  Id. at 389-90.  See also  CARL N. DEGLER, AT 
ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT, 180-83 
(1980) (describing declining birth rates that followed women’s greater ability to decline sexual 
intercourse).   
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of children per family fell from eight in 1800 to four by centuries’ end, and the 
average age of marriage rose.48  
These changes affected the moral understandings of the country as a 
whole in spite of the fact that the urban middle class, the driving force behind 
the changes, constituted a tiny part of the population.  Innovative research 
details the transmission of these values through newly created women’s 
magazines that influenced the farm wives who would constitute the majority of 
women until the much greater urbanization of the twentieth century.49  But class 
divisions ironically served to reinforce, rather than undermine, the new order.  
Mary Ryan emphasizes that the cultural divide in upstate New York involved 
the often-pejorative comparison of native-born Protestants with newly arriving 
Catholic immigrants.  The Protestant middle class identified moral superiority 
with their emphasis on their daughters’ chastity, their determination to keep 
their children away from the temptations or either employment or romance at 
too young an age, and their restriction of family size.50    The opinion leaders in 
newspapers, legislatures, courts and many pulpits heralded the new middle class 
standards as the moral order of the day, and the standard by which other classes 
might be found wanting.51   
 
The second, twentieth century transformation began in similar fashion.  
The “post-industrial economy” has moved away from heavy manufacturing to 
                                                          
48LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998).  Professor 
Larson further observes that: “A modest girl's shyness and innocence were her excuses for 
sexual delay, allowing her a leisurely period of courtship during which she could observe her 
lover and judge his qualities as a future husband.  Female sexual modesty came to represent a 
strategic advantage in the competitive "marriage market." According to the conventional 
wisdom of Victorian advice manuals, men might dally with permissive women, but they married 
only modest ones.  Both by threats and incentives, sexual modesty was thus inculcated in young 
women to protect them against the genuine threat that sexuality presented to their future 
welfare.”  Larson, “Women Understand so Little,” supra note __,  at 392. 
49 For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of the changes, see Joan Williams, Toward a 
Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 89 (1998). 
50 MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW 
YORK, 1790-1865 184-85 (1981).  The Catholic working classes, in contrast, often depended on 
their children’s labor for their families’ survival, creating incentives for larger families that 
transcended religious differences.  Moreover, factory employment, which for working class 
families could start even before the teen years, made parental supervision that much more 
difficult and further encouraged younger marriages.  See Elizabeth Pleck, A Mother’s Wages: 
Income Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896-1911, in THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY IN SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 490-515 (ed. Michael Cordon 1983)(3d ed.). 
51 See, e.g., ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND 
WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 192-241 (1988) (describing gulf between slaveholding and 
enslaved women in the antebellum American South); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, 
LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 
1-151 (1985) (comparing experience of free and enslaved black women in southern United 
States); see also Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The 
Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 10 (1988). 
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greater emphasis on the “information economy” and the service sector.52  The 
result is even greater returns to education, this time for both men and women as 
the new economy has created greater demand for the types of services women 
historically performed.53  Just as the nineteenth century changes brought greater 
specialization among men, the twentieth century changes involve greater 
specialization among women, as the new class of working mothers hires other 
women to care for their children (and frozen food diners and McDonald’s) to 
perform what were once viewed as mothers’ domestic responsibilities.54   
 
Moreover, just as the nineteenth century required a family reorganization 
and a new moral code for the middle class to reap the benefits of the new order, 
so too have the twentieth century changes required moral understandings that 
facilitate this greater investment in women -- and even later childbearing and 
smaller family size.  These new moral understandings, however, were unlikely 
to rest on increased parental vigilance and celebration of women’s virtue.   
 
While conservatives continue to decry the sexual revolution of the 
sixties, the sixties followed from the demographic changes of the fifties, which 
sounded the death knell of the old moral order.55  Indeed, as historian Stephanie 
Coontz argues, the “traditional” family of the fifties was in fact a qualitatively 
new phenomenon that reversed the trends of the rest of the century.56  By 1960, 
the number of pregnant brides rose to almost a third, a level not seen since 
1800.57  The average age of marriage fell to the lowest levels in the twentieth 
century.58  And, of course, the post-war era produced the “baby boom” —and 
dramatic rises in fertility.59  Dating had become an exercise in sexual 
brinkmanship, with marriage or adoption as the fallbacks for sexual 
experimentation.60  The changing mores of the postwar era and the needs of the 
new economy were on a collision course and something had to give way. 
                                                          
52 See, e.g., Richard G Harris, The knowledge-based economy: intellectual origins and new economic 
perspectives, 3 INTL. J. MAN. REV. 21 (2001)  
53  See CARBONE, supra note __, at 48-49 summarizing these developments 
54 See Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving 
Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2007), 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/MarriageandDivorce(JEP).pdf.  
55 Carol Sanger brilliantly describes the role of cars and suburbanization in allowing teens to 
escape parental restraints.  Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the 
Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705  (1995); see more generally BETH L. 
BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH TO BACK SEAT: COURTSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 19 
(1988) (explaining how the invention of the automobile contributed to the rise of dating by 
giving young people both privacy and mobility). 
56 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA 
TRAP 25-26 (1992). 
57 LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 92 (1998).   
58Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 THE FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 33, 35 (2005). 
59 COONTZ, NOSTALGIA TRAP, supra note  __, at 202-03. 
60 Id. at 39. 




B.  The New Middle Class Morality and Cultural Backlash    
 
What gave way first was the old moral code.  The sexual revolution and 
women’s movements now identified with the sixties remade middle class 
morality from an emphasis on woman’s virtue to concern for equality and 
responsibility.61  The transformation began as the baby boomers reached their 
college years.  The new demographic bridled at college parietal rules and sexual 
double standards.  The “pill” galvanized the shift from abstinence to 
contraception as the hallmark of responsible behavior.62   The emotionally 
agonizing choice of abortion also reinforced the conviction that childbearing 
should be reserved for the right partner at the right time in life.63   The media 
celebrated the new sexual freedom,64 and  by the eighties, the majority of the 
Americans no longer condemned pre-marital sexuality.65   
 
The remaking of moral understandings produced a cycle of reinforcing 
shifts in attitudes.  As women gained greater ability to avoid unplanned 
pregnancies, men felt less obligation to marry the women they impregnated.66   
As non-marital sexuality became more acceptable, so too did the children who 
resulted, making their mothers more willing to raise them without marrying.67  
In a parallel fashion, the shotgun marriages of the fifties produced the divorces 
                                                          
61 See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (2006).  
62 See George A. Akerloff, Janet L. Yellin, and Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of Wedlock 
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. ECONOMICS 277-303 (1996)(arguing that availability of 
contraception and abortion ironically contributed to the increase in non-marital births as women 
assumed responsibility for avoiding pregnancy, and men no longer felt obligated to marry 
unintentionally pregnant partners). 
63 CARBONE, supra note __ , at 203-04. 
64 Barbara Whitehead notes that ninety percent of women born between 1933 and 1942 were 
either virgins when they married or had engaged in their first intercourse with the man they 
subsequently married.  Today, in contrast, the average age of first intercourse for women is 17 
while the average age of first marriage is twenty-five.  Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Changing 
Pathway to Marriage: Trends in Dating, First Unions, and Marriage among Young Adults, in 
FAMILY TRANSFORMED:  RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 168, 170 (Steven 
M. Tipton and John Witte Jr. eds., 2005).  
65 By 1997, the Gallup poll found that fifty-five percent of American adults say that premarital 
sex is not wrong, and among the most directly affected, viz., the younger crowd aged 18-29, 
75% agreed that “pre-marital sexual relations are not wrong.”  Frank Newport, Gallup Poll 
Review From The Poll Editors: Sexual Norms: Where Does America Stand Today?, THE 
GALLUP POLL, December 1997, http://www.hi-ho.ne.jp/taku77/refer/sexnorm.htm.  Moreover, 
2002 data indicate that by age 20, 77% of respondents had had sex, and 75% had premarital sex.   
By age 44, 95% of respondents (94% of women, 96% of men, and 97% of those who had ever 
had sex) had had premarital sex.  Even among those who abstained until at least age 20, 81% 
had had premarital sex by age 44. Finer concludes that “[a]lmost all Americans have sex before 
marrying.”  Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 
PUB. HEALTH REPS. 73 (2007). 
66Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz, supra note __. 
67 Id. at 308 (noting also that agency adoptions fell by one- half in the five years following the 
legalization of abortion). 
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of the seventies, and less reliable marriages created greater incentives for 
women to invest in their own earning potential.68   As women attained greater 
independence, the consequences of divorce became less catastrophic, and 
unhappy partners felt less pressure to stay together.   Increasing divorces made 
single parents more visible, which weakened even further the stigma associated 
with non-marital births.  Taken together, these changes undermined the 
economic and social coercion that had promoted family stability whatever the 
quality of the enduring unions.   
 
  Conservative writers decry these changes as signs of moral decay.  Indeed, 
the shift away from marriage and two-parent families has undeniably had 
negative consequences for children.69  It is a mistake, however, to see the 
transformation only in terms of family disintegration.  Underlying the changes 
and less visible than the Playboy centerfolds that merit denunciation from the 
pulpit is a new middle class ethic – with handsome rewards for those able to 
reap its benefits.  The college educated, who postpone childrearing until the 
parents achieve a measure of financial self-sufficiency and emotional maturity, 
have become more likely to marry and less likely to divorce than the rest of the 
population, with two-parent families that remain intact, replicating the statistics 
that existed before no-fault divorce, the pill and legalized abortion.70  The rest of 
the country has seen skyrocketing rates of non-marital births, divorce, and 
single-parent families, magnifying the effects of income inequality on children. 
71  The hallmark of this new middle-class ethic is later ages of family formation, 
                                                          
68 As women gained experience and self-confidence, they won benefits that made work more 
attractive and rewarding; with longer work experience and greater educational equalization, they 
became freer to leave an unhappy marriage; and as divorce became more of a possibility, 
women tended to hedge their bets by insisting on the right to work.  Although very few 
researchers believe that women’s employment has been a direct cause of the rising divorce rate, 
most agree that women’s new employment options have made it easier for couples to separate if 
they are dissatisfied for other reasons.   In turn, the fragility of marriage has joined economic 
pressures, income incentives, educational preparation, and dissatisfaction with domestic 
isolation as one of the reasons that modern women choose to work.  See COONTZ, NOSTALGIA 
TRAP, supra note __,at 166. 
69 SARA S. MCLANAHAN AND GARY SANDAFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT 
HELPS, WHAT HURTS 109-10 (1994). 
70 For example, Sara McLanahan observes that “Children who were born to mothers from the 
most advantaged backgrounds are making substantial gains in resources.  Relative to their 
counterparts 40 years ago, their mothers are more mature and more likely to be working at well-
paying jobs.  These children were born into stable unions and are spending more time with their 
fathers.  McLanahan, supra note __, at 608. 
71 Id. at 611.  In the top quartile, only seven percent of children resided in single parent families; 
in the bottom educated quartile, 43% did.  Moreover, for the best educated, rates of single 
parenthood peaked in 1970, and have declined since then.  For the least educated, the rates rose 
sharply until 1990, and declined only in the last ten years.  Id.  McLanahan finds further that 
college educated women have now become more likely to marry than other women and less 
likely to divorce.  For couples with a four-year degree, divorce rates peaked in the late seventies 
with roughly a quarter of marriages ending within ten years.  The rates then fell to 17% by the 
late eighties.  For couples without college degrees, divorce rates reached their height with 35% 
divorcing within ten years, and declined only slightly (to about 32%) by the late eighties.   Id. 
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when adult behavior has stabilized.   Sara McLanahan shows that for the best-
educated quartile of American women, mothers’ median age rose from 26 in 
1970 to 32 in 2000.72  For mothers in the bottom quartile, it remained relatively 
flat.73    For those who avoid early child-bearing, conventional families with two 
married parents and a high degree of stability follow to a remarkable degree 
with a minimum of external coercion. 
 
This new middle class ethic, unlike its nineteenth century counterpart, is 
a direct affront to those who do not accept its premises.  The nineteenth century 
emphasis on purity, with its condemnation of those who could not live up to its 
principles, may have been hypocritical (and often racist), but it reaffirmed 
consensus-based standards of morality.   The new version, in contrast, is 
disdainful of traditional moral restraints, insistent on the rights of women and 
increasingly same-sex couples, and skeptical of once venerated institutions such 
as marriage.74   
 
Traditionalists have responded to the changes in family form, the 
negative consequences for children, and the class-based nature of the 
transformation with a sense of moral panic.75  If advocates of the new order are 
right that a promising future is the best contraceptive, this is disturbing news for 
poorer men and women who face less hopeful prospects for either marriage or 
employment.  The welfare reform legislation enacted in the mid-nineties, for 
example, was intended to address “the crisis of out-of-wedlock childbearing.”76  
The first three legislative findings state that:  "(1) Marriage is the foundation of 
a successful society. (2) Marriage is an essential institution of a successful 
society which promotes the interests of children. (3) Promotion of responsible 
fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-
being of children."77    
                                                          
72 Id. at 609. 
73 It should be noted, however, that fertility rates have also dropped, especially for teens.   
Between 1960 and 2000, for example, births to 15 to 19 year old women fell by more than half.  
The composition of the remaining births nonetheless varies by race and class.  White women, 
for example, have higher birth rates in every age group above twenty-five, while African-
Americans have higher birth rates in every cohort under twenty-five, even though both races 
report substantial declines in teen childbearing.  See Child Trends Data Bank, Percentage of 
Births to Unmarried Women, 
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/75UnmarriedBirths.cfm.   
74 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).   
75 See Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws, supra note __(discussing the role of moral panic in 
generating support for little needed or punitive policies); see also Amy L. Wax, Engine of Inequality: 
Race, Class, and Families by Choice, RUTGERS L. REV. (2007)(forthcoming). 
76 Amy L. Wax, The Two-Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective Subsidies, 
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 491 (1996). 
77 104 P.L. 193, 110 Stat. 2105, §101 (1996), Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Conciliation Act of 1996, codified at  42 U.S.C. 601 (2007). See also Gwendolyn Mink, 
WELFARE’S END 43 (1998) (emphasizing the legislative history referring to marriage, marital 
parenting and paternal involvement); Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna To Proletariat: 
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  Critical to these traditionalist ideals is the reassertion of marriage as the 
institution that unites sex, procreation and childrearing.  The Institute for 
American Values, in its statement on “Marriage and the Law” reasons that: “The 
vast majority of human children are created through acts of passion between 
men and women. Connecting children to their mother and father requires a 
social and legal institution called “marriage” with sufficient power, weight, and 
social support to influence the erotic behavior of young men and women.”78  
Rather than ground family morality in investment in higher education and 
disciplined childbearing, these advocates continue to celebrate the unity of sex, 
marriage and reproduction.  The reward in this system, particularly for those 
who may never reach the enhanced status that comes with dual college-educated 
earners, is family life itself.  Only if women “save themselves” for marriage, 
men have consistent access to women exclusively through marriage, and 
marriage remains a prerequisite for responsible parenthood can the traditional 
order maintain its moral force.79  If men enjoy sex without responsibility and 
women can construct parenthood on terms of their choosing, why does anyone 
(and more particularly the eighteen and nineteen olds eager to get on with their 
lives) have reason to wait – or plan, invest, save and prove themselves ready for 
adulthood? 
 
This clash of moral worldviews plays itself out in settings that have 
always involved a sizeable degree of intensity, viz., the control of sexuality.   It 
also, however, involves competing moral aspirations in the image of the good 
life.   Setting the terms for those aspirations—and for channeling behavior 
accordingly—has historically been the province of family law.80   
 
C.  Legal Reform and the Struggle to Redefine the Moral Center 
 
The law rarely plays a direct role in family transformation; it more 
commonly crystallizes a change that has already taken root.  In the nineteenth 
century, for example, the most visible marker of women’s greater moral 
standing was the Married Women’s Property Acts.  Yet, the first wave of 
legislation, revisionists now argue, had more to do with the protection of family 
property from creditors than with women’s rights; and only the successive 
waves toward the end of the century reflected women’s greater standing.81   In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Constructing A New Ideology Of Motherhood In Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415 
(1999). 
78 Marriage and the Law: A Statement of Principles, INSTIT. FOR AMER. VALUES, CENTER FOR 
MARRIAGE & FAM. (2006), http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/mlawstmnt_exsumm.pdf, last 
visited April 9, 2007. 
79 Wilson, supra note  __, at 216-17. 
80 See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 
(1992); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:  Revising the Channelling 
Function of Family Law, 28 CARD. L. REV. 2133 (2007).   
81 See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 
1398-1400 (1983)(arguing that first wave did not represent feminist gains); Joan Hoff, Law, 
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this context, the states enacted legislation, one at a time,82 without the interstate 
differences attaining particular importance, and with most of the legal changes 
occurring only after the changes in social sentiment made the affected laws 
seem archaic.   
 
 The modern clash, in contrast, has become geographic and cultural – and 
it is now very much about law.  Perhaps the two most polarizing issues of the 
day are abortion and same-sex marriage.83  Both have become the subject of 
multiple cases in federal and state courts, where they have been framed, not as 
family law issues, but as constitutional mandates.84    The cases are 
controversial, as we argue in the rest of this article, because they go to the 
symbolic heart of the values divide: the clash between different understandings 
of the normative commands of the two systems we have sketched above.   
 
 The law has accordingly become a fulcrum for the values divide.  Both 
family law legislation and judicial decisions play out in the context of the state 
political systems in which they are forged.  If no middle ground exists, if 
neutrality means taking sides, then every state has a position.  We will argue 
below that the “blue states” have adopted one strand of the Anglo-American 
family system: postponing childrearing until the parents achieve a measure of 
financial self-sufficiency, by which time the peak periods of testosterone 
production have passed, and couples can be expected to form stable 
relationships with a minimum of societal effort.85 Correspondingly, the laws of 
blue states guarantee access to contraception and abortion, their courts are 
generally less likely to consider sexual issues (such as adultery or sexual 
orientation) in custody decisions,86 and they are less likely to rely on abstinence 
education.   “Red states,” in contrast, continue to link family stability to the 
control of sexuality, and internalized values that associate sexuality exclusively 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Gender and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women, 377-81 (1991) ("Women reformers were 
only marginally involved ... in the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in the 1830s 
and 1840s" and cataloguing passage of acts in the appendix.).  See also Reva B. Siegel, The 
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 
GEO. L. J. 2127, 2136 (1994) (maintaining that successive waves of reform in the middle and 
later parts of the nineteenth century reflected feminist lobbying and women’s changing status). 
82 See generally KATHLEEN S.  SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT:  WOMEN AND RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN (2007)(different years for states’ enactment of 
Married Women’s Property Acts). 
83 See Post and Siegel, supra note 3, on (abortion); and Eskridge, supra note 3 (same-sex marriage) 
84 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)(comparing court 
mandate in the U.S. with legislative decision-making in Europe); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring 
Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 
50 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1999). 
85 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 44 (1977) 
(characterizing delayed marriage and the emphasis on financial independence as a unique feature of 
the northwestern European family.) 
86 See generally William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v Knott:  
Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135 
(2007)(Tables 2 and 3) (manuscript available through www.sssrn.com/abstract=958648. 
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with marriage and reproduction.87  They do so in the context of more traditional, 
often more rural, and more working class cultures in which adults are ready to 
begin childbearing at younger ages, and expect to marry shortly after women 
become sexually active.  Emphasizing abstinence education, legal control by 
parents of teen contraception and abortion decisions, less tolerance of gay and 
lesbian sexual behavior, their laws express continuing disapproval of non-
marital sexuality.88   
 
The family transformation of the later half of the twentieth century, 
unlike its predecessor in the nineteenth, clashes profoundly with the religious 
tenets held by more traditional parts of the country, and at least for the moment, 
the hinterlands are not willing to follow the lead of the urban middle class or the 
coasts.  The result appears to be an irreconcilable conflict between two very 
different moral and family systems – producing distinctively different laws.      
 
III.  DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERGENCE AND THE REMAKING OF FAMILY LIFE 
 
  Throughout this paper, we use the red/blue designation as a shorthand for 
regional variations that might underlie the development of one family model over 
another, recognizing that we are measuring something more than simply the size of 
the margin for Bush in the 2004 election.89    The first part of this section explores 
voting patterns, ranking the states in accordance with their 2004 vote, and then 
explains why we use this somewhat imperfect shorthand.   In doing so, we make 
no prediction about the 2008 election (indeed, we suspect a realignment in 
voting patterns may well occur); rather we identify the lifestyle models and 
family laws we predict will continue to diverge between the two sets of states.  
Next, we identify demographic variables that might distinguish one family 
system from the other, and rank the top five and the bottom five states for each 
characteristic.  We then consider whether consequences such as divorce and 
non-marital births follow similar geographic patterns, and finally we consider 
whether state patterns of family regulation bear any relationship to red and blue 
demographic differences.   
 
A.  Red v. Blue:  Or the Bible Belt and Mountain West v. the Northeast and the 
                                                          
87 See CARBONE, supra note __, at  60 (discussing Northwestern Europe). 
88 See notes infra. 
89 There are, of course, variations within states, generally related to the urban/rural nature of the 
population, religious affiliation, etc.  We are painting with a broad brush in noting these trends.  
See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 33-34 (2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874977 (noting “the continuum of states 
ranging from the poor conservative places of the south and east to the rich, liberal places of the 
coasts . . .  . [and] that American parties are increasing[sic] oriented around religion and culture 
rather than economics”);  STEVEN ANSOLABEHERE, JONATHAN RODDEN, AND JAMES M. SNYDER, 
JR., PURPLE AMERICA 3 (2005), http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1266 
(challenging the culture war argument and finding that most of the population can be 
characterized as moderate).  





In characterizing the polarization of family law, we start with a dilemma.  
The “red state”/”blue state” designations correspond to the votes in the 
presidential election of 2004, 90 but the Republican/Democratic vote is only a 
crude marker for the cultural systems we are attempting to capture.  Appendix B 
shows states ranked according to the percentage of voters who selected George 
Bush.  All of the states in the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic are blue.  The 
remaining blue states are either on the West Coast (California, Oregon, 
Washington, and Hawaii) or in the upper mid-west (Illinois, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin).   Moreover, the Midwest states of MI, MN and WI, 
along with OR, PA, and NH, were so close in votes they could easily be 
characterized as “purple.”91 
 
 The 31 red states are more culturally diverse.  The first three red states 
(Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho) are mountain west states with a concentration of 
Mormon voters in Utah and southern Idaho, but not Wyoming.   The remaining 
red states are in the plains, the South, the border, Southwest and central mid-
west.  Six of these states (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Nevada, and 
Ohio) can be characterized as purple, and they reinforce the overall sense of the 
southwest and Midwest as battlegrounds.92  All were close in both the 2000 and 
2004 elections.  Some of the states, particularly Ohio and Colorado, may be 
characterized by urban /rural splits within the state.   
 
                                                          
90 The blue states are:  California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  The rest are red.  See 
MICHAEL GASTNER, COSMA SHALIZI, AND MARK NEWMAN, ET AL., MAPS AND CARTOGRAMS OF 
THE 2004 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS,  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election.  
As they emphasize, however, using a scale of percentage of voters results in a map that is more 
purple than red.  Id.; see ROBERT J. VANDERBIEL, ELECTION 2004 RESULTS, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~rvdb/JAVA/election2004/  Moreover, Bush or Kerry won by less 
than 6% in 12 of these states,  
91 In their study of electoral polarization, Abramowitz and Saunders excluded the 12 states in 
which the margin of victory was less than 6%, identifying these states as “purple, Abramowitz 
and Saunders, supra note __, at  13, and we believe that such a characterization is useful  for 
purposes of measuring the degree of national political division.   These twelve states, some of 
which were in the Kerry column, some of which were in the Bush column, were:  Colorado, 
Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  The analysis in this article, however, is more focused on 
identifying  regional patterns than on examining precise voting outcomes in specific elections, 
particularly as the 2008 election looms on the horizon  .  New Hampshire is perhaps the most 
complex of the “purpose states” in these terms.  It has historically been Republican, and, indeed, 
is the only state to have voted for Bush in 2000, but for Kerry in 2004.  Political analysts believe 
a factor in the New Hampshire voting  switch was the growth of the Boston suburbs, with 
migration from decidedly more liberal Massachusetts changing the demographics of what had 
once been a more rural state. 
92 All were decided by less than 6% points, consistent with the Abramowitz and Saunders 
definition.  Id. at 13. 
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For our purposes, the factor that is more relevant than the total 
Republican vote is the intensity of voter positions on issues related to moral 
values – at least to the extent those views serve as cultural markers of the two 
family systems we describe, and we suspect that they do.  That is, we suspect 
that the intensity of the political commitment to “moral values” indicates a 
willingness to support legislation that would produce different laws from those 
adopted in areas of the country committed to what we have called the “new 
middle class morality.”  We will test that hypothesis in this part of the paper.   
 
 In 2004, pollsters, for the first time, included “moral values” in the list of 
issues they asked to voters to rank in importance.93  Voters chose moral values 
and the economy, respectively, as their two top concerns, with roughly 22% of 
the electorate listing each.  Terrorism, the war in Iraq, health care, education and 
other issues followed.  For those choosing “moral values,” 78% voted for Bush, 
while 80% of those selecting the economy as their primary concern voted for 
Kerry.   In Ohio, an all important bellwether state with an anti-gay marriage 
proposition on the ballot designed to increase turnout among evangelicals, 90% 
of those listing moral values as their top concern voted for Bush, according to an 
independent FOX News-Opinion Dynamics poll taken on election night.94  
Pundits disagree about the impact of the moral values issue on the election 
outcome, but most accept that it serves as a marker of regional differences in 
outlook.  John Green and Mark Silk, for example, note that Bush carried every 
region (Southern Crossroads, Mountain West, the South and the Midwest)95 in 
which the percentage of voters choosing moral values as the issue of greatest 
importance exceeded the national average, while he lost every region (New 
England, the Middle Atlantic, Pacific and Pacific Northwest) in which moral 
values voters fell below the national average.96  Moreover, in the regions that 
Bush carried, a higher percentage of Bush voters (two-fifths or more) ranked 
moral values as their top concern, while Kerry carried the regions in which Bush 
voters ranked moral values as a lesser concern.97   The second and third most 
highly rated issues (the economy and terrorism), in contrast, did not vary 
                                                          
93 The other issues included the economy, terrorism, Iraq, taxes, education, and health care.  See 
CNN.com, Election Results (2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.   
94 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Values Help Shape Bush Re-Election, FoxNews.com, November 04, 
2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137535,00.html.  
95 Green and Silk’s definition of regions differs somewhat from the ones used in the census and 
which we use in this article.  We find, for example, on values issues that Utah, Wyoming and 
Idaho share family characteristics that distinguish them from Colorado, which is somewhat more 
urban and more racially diverse, and the “Southern Crossroads” region, which combines 
Louisiana, with demographics more characteristic of the Deep South, with Texas, whose large 
Latino population makes it somewhat more characteristic of the Southwest, with Oklahoma, 
Arkansas and Missouri, states that we believe have more in common with the border states of 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and  West Virginia. 
96 John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8 RELIGION IN THE NEWS  
(2005), http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm. 
97 Id. 
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regionally to any significant degree.98   
 
The 2004 exit polls did not ask about moral values in every state, 
however, and no comprehensive data exist that allow the same analysis by 
state.99   While a state-by-state breakdown might provide greater insight, the 
available results suggest, in Martin and Silk’s words,  that: “Geography matters 
in American politics today above all” and ultimately, “those first-day stories about 
moral values—and the red-and-blue maps that went with them—conveyed 
something real.”100  That “something real” includes the use of  “moral values” to 
signal commitment to a political approach in which opposition to abortion and 
same-sex marriage are organizing principles, and matters that generate voter 
intensity.101  In the absence of comprehensive data about “moral values,” we agree 
that the overall 2004 election outcomes provide a rough guide to regional variations 
in worldviews. 
 
 We recognize further that all commentators on the 2004 election emphasize 
that every state is “purple” to some degree, and that county breakdowns show blue 
and red patches within states, often corresponding to urban/rural divisions.  
Nonetheless, even the county breakdowns reflect regional variations.   New 
England, for example, has now emerged as the most intensely “blue” part of the 
country, by county as well as by state, followed by the mid-Atlantic region and the 
West Coast.102   The three states with the smallest percentages of Republican voters 
in the 2004 election were all from New England, and, as noted earlier, Kerry 
carried every New England and mid-Atlantic state.103  
 
                                                          
98 Id.  The fourth issue (Iraq) did vary more, with those regions in which the war concerned a 
higher percentage of voters voting for Kerry. 
99 Id. Green and Silk note that “[u]nfortunately, such an analysis cannot be conducted for the 
2005 election because the number of interviews per state in the national exit poll is not high 
enough to give meaningful results for many states—and not all state exit polls included a “moral 
values” option.” 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  Green and Silk observe further that while moral values voters describe a block dominated 
by Protestant evangelicals in areas of the country in which evangelicals have organized, the 
evangelical discourse has selectively influenced those of other religions. They include, for 
example, an in depth comparison of magenta Ohio (which Bush carried) and violet Michigan (a 
Kerry state).  Both states include significant numbers of church attending Catholics.  Bush 
carried the Catholic vote in Ohio, however, but lost it in Michigan.  See also supra note 28, 
particularly Baldassari and Gelman suggesting greater polarization on moral values than other 
issues. 
102 See MICHAEL GASTNER, COSMA SHALIZI, AND MARK NEWMAN, ET AL., MAPS AND 
CARTOGRAMS OF THE 2004 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS,  http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election.  We adopt Green and Silk’s definition of New England as 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Maine.  On the other 
hand, we see the West Coast (California, Oregon and Washington) as more culturally similarly 
than Green and Silk’s categories of Pacific (California, Hawaii and Nevada) and Northwest 
(Washington, Oregon and Alaska). 
103 See the listing in Appendix A. 
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 Nonetheless, some regional patterns are more complex.  The most intensely 
conflicted part of the country, culturally as well politically, is almost certainly the 
mid-West.104  These states split between Bush and Kerry and, as the Green and Silk 
comparison of Ohio and Michigan indicates, they often involve distinct attitudes 
and values even among demographically similar voters.105   Moreover, it is clearly 
a mistake to assume that even solidly “red” parts of the country are uniform.  The 
top three states, in terms of percentage of the population voting for Bush, were 
Utah (71%), Wyoming (69%) and Idaho (68%)—all three heavily rural mountain 
west states with influential Mormon communities, and relatively few African-
Americans or Latinos.  They differ significantly from other mountain west states 
(Montana 59%, Arizona 55%, Colorado 52%, Nevada 50% and New Mexico 50%) 
both in the depth of Republican support and in demographic and cultural 
characteristics.   Moreover, the South and the border states, though more 
consistently “red” in terms of voting patterns, include large African-American 
populations, who support the moral values political agenda to a higher degree than 
other Democratic voters, and vote Democratic to a greater degree than other deeply 
religious voters.  Nonetheless, the South and the border states have at least as 
distinctive a culture as New England or the mid-Atlantic states, and they are as 
solidly (if not more) Republican than the New England and mid-Atlantic states are 
Democratic even if their voting patterns are less monolithic than those of Utah, 
Idaho or Wyoming.106 
 
B.   Moral Values or Moral Panic? 
 
 If any social changes have inspired widespread cultural alarm and legal 
responses, they are the growth in non-marital births and divorce.  Both correlate 
with the age at which the mother marries or becomes pregnant.    In turn, if any 
characteristic correlates with the new middle class morality, it is later age of 
childrearing.  We therefore identify age of significant life events as an important 
marker of regional variation.  In this section, we examine whether the regional 
variations that influenced election returns also affect patterns of family 
formation. 
 
 1.   Teens  
 
                                                          
104 Green and Silk, supra note __, identify the Midwestern states as Indiana,  Iowa, Illinois, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.    
105 Id.  Green and Silk noted that despite their demographic and economic similarities and 
geographic proximity, even church going evangelicals in Michigan were less likely to list moral 
values as a prime concern than in Ohio, and they were correspondingly less likely to vote for 
Bush.   
106 Virginia, with 54% voting for Bush, was the least Republican of Southern states, while only 
49% of New Hampshire (New England) or Pennsylvania (mid-Atlantic) voted for Kerry.  We 
define the South as North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana and Florida.  We define the Border states as West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, and Arkansas.  We view Texas as part of the Southwest, given its large Latino 
population, and Missouri as part of the Midwest, largely because of its larger urban population. 
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 We start with an examination of teen sexuality, evaluating the teen 
pregnancy, birth and abortion rates.  The strongest indicators of cultural 
divergence involve the response to managing early sexual experience, and 
readiness for family formation.   
 
 a. Pregnancy rates  
 
The highest teen pregnancy rates were in Nevada, Arizona, Mississippi, 
New Mexico and Texas, all red states, though New Mexico and Nevada were 
battleground areas.107  The lowest rates were in North Dakota, Maine, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Minnesota and Maine, all blue except North Dakota, with New 
Hampshire as contested turf.108 
 
b. Abortion rates  
 
Abortion ratios, defined as the number of abortions for every 1000 
births, complement the picture of regional variation.  The states with the five 
highest ratios for teens are New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
and Maryland, all red states from the New England or mid-Atlantic regions.109  
The states with the lowest teen abortion ratios are Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, South Dakota, Oklahoma and West Virginia.  With the exception of 
South Dakota, they are all Southern or border states.110   
 
c.  Teen birth rates   
 
Teen birth rates are measured in terms of the number of births per 
thousand female teens in the population.  The birth rates reflect the level of 
sexual activity offset by access to contraception and abortion.  The five states111 
with the lowest rates of teen births are all concentrated in the Northeast and all 
voted for Kerry: New Hampshire,112 Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Maine.  In contrast; the five states with the highest teen birth rates are all red 
and are all in the South or the Southwest:  Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi, 
                                                          
107 GUTTMACHER INSTIT., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY STATISTICS, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS BY 
RACE AND ETHNICITY 11 (2006) (hereinafter referred to Guttmacher).   
108 Id. 
109   As discussed in the section on parental notification statutes, these states, other than 
Massachusetts, have fewer restrictions on teen abortions than do virtually all of the red states. 
110 Guttmacher, supra, at 11.  If we were to measure abortion rates as opposed to ratios, New 
Jersey, New York and Maryland would remain in the top five, but Massachusetts and 
Connecticut would be replaced by Nevada and California.  Id.   The lowest abortion rates would 
change more with the five lowest states: Utah, South Dakota, North Dakota, Kentucky and West 
Virginia.  Utah, North Dakota and South Dakota also have relatively low teen pregnancy rates 
compared with the states Kentucky and West Virginia or the states with higher abortion ratios.  
111 To make the analysis more cogent, we focus on the highest and lowest five states in each 
category 
112 New Hampshire, unlike the others, however, was so close that it could be more accurately 
described as  “purple.”   See note __  , supra. 
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Arizona, and Arkansas.113   Moreover, as a general matter, while teen birth rates 
have declined for the country as a whole, they have fallen much more rapidly in 
New England than elsewhere.  Whereas mid-Western states such as Iowa and 
Minnesota had some of the lowest teen birth rates in the country in 1988, their 
rates have stayed relatively stable while those in the Northeast have plunged.  
The high teen birth states have, in contrast, seen relatively little decline over the 
last twenty years.114 
 
 These figures reflect not just political patterns but also racial 
demographics.   In Texas, Arizona and “purple” New Mexico, significantly 
more than half of the teen births were to Hispanics.115  The majority of children 
born to teenagers in Arkansas and Mississippi were white, but African-
Americans constitute a significant percentage of the overall totals.  Taking just 
whites into account, the top teen birth rates would have been concentrated in the 
border states and the South:  Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma and 
Tennessee.116   The lowest rates for whites were in New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island.   
 
 The pattern for African-Americans is a little harder to gauge.  The states 
with the lowest African-American teen birth rates are New Hampshire, Utah, 
New York, and Rhode Island, with California, Massachusetts, and New Mexico 
tied for fifth.  New Hampshire (under 1%), New Mexico (under 2%), and Utah 
(2%) have such small African-American populations as to make analysis 
difficult.   The states with the highest rates of African-American births are not 
concentrated by region, and include Wisconsin, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi 
and Ohio.  Accordingly, the low overall state teen birth rates for the states in the 
upper part of New England may reflect a lack of diversity, 117 and the high rates 
in the Southwest may reflect the percentage of Latinos.118  Nonetheless, the teen 
                                                          
113 CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, TEEN BIRTH RATES RANKED LOWEST TO HIGHEST (2003) 
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/13_PDF.pdf.  In 1988, by contrast, the lowest teen birth 
rates would have in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire and 
Vermont while the highest rates would have been in Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, Texas 
and Arizona.  The relative changes involve a steady decline in teen birth rates in New England 
compared to stable rates in the upper Midwest.   
114 Id. at 13. 
115 See Guttmacher. supra note __.  Hispanic voters are relatively conservative on values issues, 
but more likely to vote Democratic than whites with similar concerns.   
116  Id. 
117  Whites who are not of Hispanic or Latino origin constitute 69% of the U.S. total, but 96.5% 
of the population of Maine, 96.2% in Vermont, and 95.1% of New Hampshire.  These rates fall 
to 81.9% in Mass., and 77.4% in Connecticut.  In the core mid-Atlantic states of New York and 
New Jersey, in contrast, whites constitute 62% and 66% of the population respectively.  
Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of U.S. Diversity, U.S. Census Bureau, December 7, 
2001, last revised 2/27/02. 
118  Latinos constitute 42% of the population of New Mexico, 32.4% of California, 32% of 
Texas, and 25% of Arizona.  Moreover, since the Latino population in these states is 
substantially younger than the white population, and fertility rates are higher, the effect on the 
teen birth rate is substantial.  Id.   
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births for whites alone diverge most between the core northeastern states and the 
southern states.  
 
           d.  Marital and non-marital rates 
 
A comparison of marital versus non-marital teen births completes the 
data on overall births.  The states with the highest percent of teen births to 
unmarried mothers are Massachusetts (only 8% of teen births are marital), 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island (9%), and Connecticut and Maryland 
(10%),119 all blue states and states with relatively low teen birth rates.120  The 
states with the highest percentages of teen births taking place within marriage 
are Idaho, where 36% of teen births are marital, Utah, with 34%, Texas, with 
27%, and Colorado, Kentucky, and Wyoming, each with 26%.121   Not only are 
all of these states red, but Utah, Wyoming and Idaho produced the highest 
percentage of Republican voters in 2004 of any states in the union.   
 
e.  Summary  
 
These data establish that the “blue states” of the Northeast and the mid-
Atlantic have lower teen birth rates, higher  use of abortion, and lower 
percentages of teen births within  marriage, while a second set of “red states” 
concentrated in the South and the Southern border tend to have higher teen birth 
rates, fewer abortions, and a higher percentage of teen births occurring with 
marriage.122   The first set of states effectively discourages teen childbearing, 
with abortion as an established fallback.123  Those teens who do give birth, 
however, may either feel little pressure or have little opportunity to marry.  In 
the second set of states, where teen birth rates are higher and more of them are 
within marriage, family formation begins at earlier ages.  The higher birth rates 
may thus reflect either more intentional births within marriage or greater 
reliance on shot gun marriages rather than abortion to deal with accidental 
                                                          
119  Id. 
120 Indeed, Massachusetts and Rhode Island are the two “bluest” states, Maryland is fifth, and 
Connecticut is tied for sixth.  See Appendix A. 
121  Facts at a Glance, CHILDTRENDS, Publication ##2006-03, Table 1 (2006), 
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006.pdf 
122 Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, among the states with the lowest teen birth rate, also 
had high percentages of nonmarital teen births: in Vermont, it was 87%, New Hampshire 89%, 
and Maine 88%.  Id.    The percent of births to teen mothers with respect to all births in the state 
was highest in New Mexico (17%), followed by Mississippi (16%), Arkansas and Louisiana 
(15%), and Alabama and Oklahoma (14%).  Id.  The lowest percentages were in Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont (6%), and Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, and 
Utah (7%).  Id. 
123 Teen pregnancy, as opposed to birth rates, suggest a somewhat different regional distribution.  
The lowest teen pregnancy rates were in North Dakota, Vermont, New Hampshire, Minnesota 
and Maine.  Guttmacher, supra note __, at 11.  The states with the highest teen pregnancy rates 
were Nevada, Arizona, Mississippi and Texas.  Id.. 
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pregnancies.124    
 
            2.  The relationship of age, marriage, and divorce 
 
The relative age of marriage can be expected to complement the regional 
variations evident in the birth figures, and it does.  The age of legal marriage in 
most states is 18.  In the United States as a whole, the median age of marriage 
for women is 25.1, while for men it is 26.7.125  This has changed dramatically 
since 1960, when the median age at first marriage was 20.3 for women, and 22.8 
for men.126    The five states with the lowest median age of marriage are red 
states: Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky, states that also have 
relatively high teen birth and/or low abortion rates.127  Correspondingly, the 
states with the highest median age of marriage are blue: Massachusetts, New 
York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey.   
 
Age of first birth corresponds with the marriage figures.  In 2000, the 
mean age of the mother at her first live birth for the country as a whole was 
24.9; Massachusetts had the highest mean age, at 27.8, followed by Connecticut 
(27.2), New Jersey (27.1), New Hampshire (26.7), and New York (26.4).  In 
contrast, Mississippi had the lowest (22.5), followed by Arkansas (22.7), 
Louisiana and New Mexico (23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2).128  
Over the past thirty years, all states have experienced an increase in the mean 
age of mothers at which the first child is born, but the changes range from a 5.3 
year increase in Massachusetts to a 1.9 year increase in Utah.129  With the 
highest rates of change concentrated in the northeast and mid-Atlantic states, 
and the smallest rates of change in the states with the lowest average ages of 
birth, the gap between the states is growing.130  
                                                          
124 Race seems to play more of a role in the abortion ratios than in overall birth rates.  New 
York, New Jersey and Maryland all report more African-American pregnancies and births 
among African-Americans than among white teens.  The New England states, however, with 
even lower teen birth rates, have significantly smaller percentages of African-Americans and 
lower abortion rates than the mid-Atlantic states.  Guttmacher, supra, at 11.  Moreover, whereas 
in 1988, California and Hawaii ranks 1 and 2 in abortion rates, today those states have fallen out 
of the top five, and been replaced by mid-Atlantic states with higher African-American 
populations.  Id.  African-Americans nationally have substantially greater teen abortion rates 
and ratios than whites.  Id. at 4. 
125 Tallese Johnson and Jane Dye, INDICATORS OF MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2000 TO 2003, Table 1 (2005), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/mar-fert-slides.html.   
126  Infoplease, Median Age at First Marriage, INFORMATION PLEASE DATABASE (2007), 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html.  On the other hand, in 1890, the median age of 
first marriage for men was 26.1, and 22.0 for women. 
127 See supra note. ___. 
128 T.J. Mathews and Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000, 51 NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP. 1, 10 (Table 3) (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf.  
129 Id. 
130 Id.  Looking at just the 1990’s, however, the areas with the biggest jump in age of first birth 
were D.C., Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and New Jersey, North Carolina and 




 The states with the highest divorce rates in 2004 were Nevada,131 
Arkansas, Wyoming, Idaho, and Kentucky, while those with the lowest are 
primarily, though not entirely, blue states, with Massachusetts, followed by 
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Illinois, and Connecticut.132 Divorce rates vary 
with the number of people marrying, particularly as those most at risk for 
divorce become increasingly less likely to marry at all.  Nonetheless, divorce 
risk also increases with younger age of marriage, lower economic status, and 
having a baby either prior to marriage or within the first seven months after 
marriage.133  Accordingly, family strategies that either emphasize marrying 
young, or marriage as the solution to an improvident pregnancy are likely to 
increase rates of divorce, all other things being equal.  Later ages of marriage 
and first births, however, lower overall fertility.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
percent of childless women is highest in the Northeast states, and lowest in the 
southern states.134  The nineteen states with the highest fertility rates are red, 
while the sixteen states with the lowest fertility rates are blue.135    
                                                                                                                                                                             
Virginia.  The states with the least change were Wyoming and Alaska, which showed declines in 
age, New Mexico, which stayed the same, and South Dakota and North Dakota. Id. 
131 Nevada’s divorce rate, like its marriage rate, however, most likely reflects its tradition of 
relatively lax residency requirements. 
132 The CDC figures on divorce rates, which include rates for every one of the five years from 
1999 to 2004, provide a better sense of patterns over time than the census figures.  These tables 
also show the states with the highest divorce rates as Nevada, Arkansas, Wyoming, and Idaho, 
with West Virginia and Alabama ahead of Kentucky over the five year period.  The CDC tallies 
include Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania in the top five, but show New Jersey and 
Wisconsin with more consistently low rates than North Dakota or Connecticut.  Division of 
Vital Stat., Nat’l Center for Health Stat., Center for Disease Control, Divorce Rates by State: 
1990, 1995, and 1999-2004 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/divorce90_04.pdf 
133   Paul R. Amato and Stacy J. Rogers, A Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and 
Subsequent Divorce, 59 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 612, 621 (1997); A. Booth 
and J. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47 J. OF  MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 
67-95 (1985); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD AND DAVID POPENOE, STATE OF OUR UNIONS:  THE 
SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA Box 2 (2004), 
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/TEXTSOOU2004.htm#Divorce.  
134 Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women:  June 2004, 20-555 CURRENT POPULATION 
REP. 1, 4,table 2 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf.  It was 48% in the 
northeast, which includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; and 42.5% in the south, which included 
Delaware, Maryland, DC, Virginia, West Virgina, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and 
Texas.  The statistics did not include a further breakdown by state.   
135 Steve Sailer, Birth Gap:  How Birthrates Color the Electoral Map, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, 
Dec. 2004, http://www.amconmag.com/2004_12_06/cover.html. 
In the United States, there are 1,182 children born for every 1,000 women. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU TABLE S1.  FERTILITY INDICATORS FOR WOMEN 15 TO 44 YEARS OLD BY STATE OF 
RESIDENCE:  JUNE 2004, (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/tabS1.xls.  
D.C. is, once again, an outlier, with a fertility rate of 776.  States with the lowest fertility rates 
for never-married women were mixed, with Utah, a red state, with the lowest rate of 208, 
followed by Delaware (213), Minnesota (234), North Dakota (241), Idaho (247), and New 
Hampshire (254). Id.  Alaska has the highest fertility rate, with 1,435 children born per 1,000 
women, followed by Arkansas (1,418), Utah and Mississippi (1,393), and South Dakota (1,368).  
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Adult abortion rates correlate with lower birth rates.  The states with the 
highest abortion ratios – the number of abortions per 1,000 live births to women 
between the ages of 15-44  – were New York, Delaware, Washington, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut.136  They each had a ratio of over 300.  The 
states with the lowest abortion ratios, with rates under 100, were Colorado, 
Utah, Idaho, and South Dakota. Kentucky was fifth with a ratio slightly over 
100.137  Similarly, states with the lowest abortion rates were Colorado, Utah, 
Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota, while those with the highest abortion rates 
were New York, Delaware, Washington, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.138   
 
The abortion rates show a slightly different regional emphasis from the 
birth rates discussed earlier, although the blue state tilt remains unchanged.   
The less diverse, upper New England states of Vermont and New Hampshire do 
not appear on the lists of states with the highest abortion rates, replaced by west 
coast Washington,139 and more of the mid-Atlantic states: New York, New 
Jersey, and Delaware.   The states with the lowest abortion rates are largely from 
the less diverse mountain states and upper Midwest (Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and 
South Dakota), largely excluding the South with the exception of Kentucky.140  
Abortion rates accordingly replicate red-blue, if not always Northeast-South, 
patterns of division.   
 
 Finally, a consideration of household composition again reflects a 
general, if less uniform, red-blue state replication.   The states with the highest 
rates of unmarried partners are Maine (7.3), New Hampshire (7.2), Vermont 
(7.1), Alaska (6.6),  and tied for fifth, Arizona and Nevada (6.3).  The states 
reporting the fewest unmarried partners are Alabama (3.0), Utah (3.4), Arkansas 
(3.6), Mississippi (3.8), with Kentucky and Kansas (4.0) tied for fifth.141   . 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The states with the lowest fertility rates are: Maryland (991), Vermont (1,000), Massachusetts 
(1,020), Maine (1,022), and Delaware (1,023).  Id.  Unsurprisingly, the states with the highest 
percentages of childless women track the fertility rates: Vermont (53.5%), Massachusetts (51.2), 
Delaware (49.1), New York (48.5), and Maine (48.2)—all blue. The states with the lowest 
percentages of childless women are Arkansas (35.3%), Mississippi (35.4), Alaska (38.0), 
Alabama (38.7) and Georgia (39.3)—all red  Id.. 
136 Laurie D. Elam-Evans et al., Abortion Surveillance, United States, 2000, 52 
SURVEILLENANCE SUMMARIES 1, 29 Table 3 (2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5212a1.htm. 
137 Id.  Florida and Louisiana had low rates as well, but did not report the number of abortions 
with respect to in-state residents.  Id. 
138   Id.  States with incomplete measures of were again excluded, as was the District of 
Columbia. 
139 Washington, while more diverse than the upper New England states, was still 78.9% white, 
with only 3% African-Americans.  CYNTHIA A. BREWER AND TRUDY A. SUCHAN, MAPPING 
CENSUS 2000: THE GEOGRAPHY OF U.S. DIVERSITY, U.S. Census Bureau (2001) 
140 These data were also less complete than others, with a number of Southern states missing 
from the tables.  
141 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, supra note __, at Table 2. Non-marital 
birth rates, in contrast, seem to be largely a reflection of race, religious and ethnic patterns.  The 




 C.   A Cultural Snapshot 
 
The demographic data supports the emergence of two strikingly different 
life cycle patterns in the United States, patterns that are correlated with a state’s 
political votes in the 2004 U.S. presidential election.  The patterns reflect 
different understandings about family formation, with prominent differences in 
age of marriage and first birth, teen childbearing and abortion rates, and overall 
levels of marriage, divorce and fertility.  Our evaluation of this picture does not 
purport, however, to address causation.  That is, we have made no effort to say 
that a pregnant nineteen-year old is choosing to conceive and bear a child 
because she lives in Mississippi rather than Massachusetts.142 
 
 Instead, we have tried to sketch a regional snapshot of cultural 
differences.  We believe that the milieu in which legal issues are decided and the 
worldviews voters bring to the ballot box frame the family law questions of our 
era.  Accordingly, we emphasize that these issues take on different symbolic 
meaning if young adults characteristically marry at 22 rather than 32, and if teen 
pregnancy is a routine pathway to marriage rather than an inopportune event to 
be managed.  Moreover, we suspect that political attitudes might well vary in 
states where over half the population lives in married couple households versus 
those where household patterns are more diverse.  We maintain that even if 
regional differences reflect an amalgam of income, class, and cultural origins, 
they nonetheless frame family law decision-making.143 
                                                                                                                                                                             
states with the lowest birth rates to never married mothers are Utah (208 per 1000 women of 
child-bearing age), Vermont (213), Minnesota (234), North Dakota (241) and Idaho (247).  
These states, a mix of red and blue, have relatively little diversity U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility 
of American Women, supra.  If we were to consider only the birthrates to unmarried women 
from 2000 to 2003, however, we would pick up Colorado and New Jersey in the top ten, states 
with considerably more diverse populations.  American Community Survey, supra. The states 
with the highest birth rates to never married mothers are Mississippi (690), Georgia (678), 
Michigan (600), Alabama (570), and Alaska (556). U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility of American 
Women, supra.  If we were to look instead at recent births, the top five would be Mississippi, 
Louisiana, South Carolina, New Mexico and Alabama.  Indicators of Marriage, supra.    
142 We have not used regression analyses to control for income (blue states are wealthier), 
religion (Baptists dominate in much of the south, Lutherans in the upper mid-west, etc.), rural v. 
urban living or ethnicity to any comprehensive degree. In addition, while we believe that these 
data show striking regional variations in consequences – divorce rates, fertility, and non-marital 
birth rates – we believe that any normative assessment of consequences does require regression 
analyses that control for income, race and ethnicity, and economic opportunity.   
Moreover, there are data which show somewhat less polarization between red and blue 
states than in the picture we have painted in this section, such as the data on marital household 
composition by state.  We are trying to show general patterns, but certainly acknowledge that 
not all lifestyle choices differ dramatically between red and blue states, or, indeed, among all red 
and blue states. 
143 We will amplify on this point below, but we argue that unlike social science analysis, our 
object here is not to isolate causation of sociological events.  Instead, we wish to depict a 
process of cultural changes that makes legal innovations more or less acceptable.  We will argue 
therefore the critical question is not to what degree younger age of marriage, for example, 
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 IV.  FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY VALUES  
 
  The most striking feature in the data above involves what 
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has called “different pathways to adulthood.”144  
Traditional family rearing practices supervised daughters’ chastity from their 
parents’ homes into marriage.  The new blue state system allows for a 
substantial period of independence – and sexual experimentation – before 
assumption of adult responsibilities.  How does the law, which does not directly 
address the transition to adulthood outside setting an age of majority, address 
these issues? 
 
  The legal age of marriage is fairly consistent throughout the 
United States, so something other than the age of consent must be responsible 
for the median age variations of marriage between different regions.  The 
conflict between the two systems focuses instead on the symbolic: on public 
reinforcement of private understandings of appropriate behavior.   
 
  In this section, we contrast two distinct types of legal decision-
making.  First, we consider legislative action addressing two symbolic 
flashpoints in the culture wars:  parental consent to abortion, and same-sex 
marriage.145  These “wedge” issues, though they have changed somewhat over 
time, involve political mobilization to pass legislation that affects relatively few 
people, albeit in often destructive ways.  We contrast red state and blue states 
attitudes and strategies toward these issues.   
 
  Second, we explore case law in the less publicized arenas of the 
role of non-marital cohabitation in custody decisionmaking.  Here, while red 
states and blue states vary in their approaches to these issues, courts, unlike 
legislatures, have greater ability to finesse cultural conflict.  We suggest that the 
differences between legislative and judicial action provide models for diffusing 
rather than inflaming cultural tensions.  We end by considering the implications 
of family law polarization for a federal system. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reflects ethnic composition – African-Americans and Latinos clearly start families at younger 
ages – but to what degree voter willingness to assist those bearing children at younger ages 
reflects cultural norms.  See infra TAN __. 
144 See Whitehead, supra note __. 
145 There are, of course, other laws which show similar trends, such as those related to parental 
leave.  The states that provide the most comprehensive job protection to employees who take a 
leave for either family or medical reasons are California, Hawaii, Oregon, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Washington, Maine, Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Louisiana, 
Wisconsin, New Hampshire, New York, and Tennessee (there are only 2 red states in the top 
16).  JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER AND NIRALI PATEL, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND 
FAMILIES, EXPECTING BETTER:  A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 
15 (2005), 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/PaidLeave/ParentalLeaveReportMay05.pd
f.We leave a fuller discussion of these and similar to our forthcoming book. 




A.  Parental Authority or Teen Autonomy? 
 
 If regulation of teen sexuality is a critical factor in the transition to 
adulthood, then the allocation of decision-making authority in this realm is 
likely to be a symbolic flashpoint.  The struggle between proponents of 
abstinence education and comprehensive sex education, for example, is a 
dramatic illustration of this flashpoint.146  Here, we address what we believe to 
be a central battlefield in the cultural war: parental notification as a prerequisite 
for teen abortion. 
 
 Roe v. Wade,147 the Supreme Court decision, upholding a woman’s right 
to an abortion over state prohibitions, has been one of the most divisive issues of 
the era since it was decided in 1973.   Political candidates have repeatedly 
vowed to support an abortion ban, and Congress and state legislatures have 
adopted a series of measures designed to undermine access.148  Moreover, 
private campaigns to picket, threaten and in some cases attack abortion 
providers have effectively limited its availability in many areas.  In South 
Dakota, for example, one of the most hostile states to abortion efforts, only one 
provider remains, and that clinic stays open only with the assistance of out-of-
state doctors who fly into Sioux Falls once a week.149 
 
 Nonetheless, the issue of parental consent to teen abortions takes on 
particular salience in the cultural conflict between family systems.  On the one 
hand, the idea that parents should be involved in a decision concerning a minor 
child has intuitive appeal.  Moreover, advocates emphasize the benefits of 
improved parent-teen communication,150 including protection of sexually active 
teens from predatory partners.  New Hampshire, for example, justified its 
parental notification statute as serving “several compelling state interests, 
including protecting the emotional and physical health of the pregnant mother, 
vindicating the importance of the parent-child relationship, and promoting the 
family unit.”151  Senators who enacted interstate parental notification measures 
                                                          
146 Kristin Luker provides a  telling cultural account of the abstinence education battles, KRISTIN 
LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL:  WARRING VIEWS ON SEX -- AND SEX EDUCATION -- SINCE 
THE SIXTIES (2006). 
147 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
148 See, e.g., the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 
1610 (2007). 
149 Two other states have only one abortion provider: North Dakota and Louisiana. Evelyn 
Nieves, S.D. Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws And Stigma:  Out-of-State Doctors Come 
Weekly to 1 Clinic,  Wash. Post, Tuesday, December 27, 2005, at A01. 
150 E.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey,  505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. at 417 (1990).  
151 Brief for Petitioners at 10-12, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).  Professor 
Teresa Collett notes that parental notification laws can benefit minors through improving 
medical care and providing protection from sexual assault.  Teresa Stanton Collett, Protecting 
Our Daughters: The Need for Parental Notification Laws, 26 VT. L. REV. 101, 102 (2001). 
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in 2006 “conjured up images of lascivious older men ferrying off their sexual 
prey to out-of-state abortion clinics”152 and emphasized the importance of 
parent-child communication.153   At the core of the issue – both as a cultural and 
constitutional matter – is deference to parental authority.154  
 
On the other hand, empirical studies show that teens overwhelmingly do 
consult their parents when they elect to have abortions.155  Opposition to 
mandatory parental involvement focuses on the reasons a minority does not, and 
the potential effect on the timing of abortions.  An early study by Planned 
Parenthood found that of those minors who did not inform their parents of their 
abortions, 30 percent had histories of violence in their families, feared the 
occurrence of violence, or were afraid of being kicked out of their homes.156  
Other studies find that parental notification laws delay medical treatment, 
turning otherwise routine abortions into riskier procedures.157 Moreover, 
                                                          
152 Collett, Parental Notification, supra note __. 
153 For a comprehensive statement of the benefits of parental notification laws, including claims 
that such law help reduce teen pregnancy, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors For 
Immoral Purposes: The Case For The Child Custody Protection Act & The Child Interstate 
Abortion Notification Act, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 107 (2006).  For a discussion of the 
methodological issues underlying such claims, see THEODORE JOYCE,  SILVIE COLMAN AND 
ROBERT KAESTNER,  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE EVALUATION OF PARENTAL 
INVOLVEMENT LAWS: EVIDENCE FROM TEXAS (2006) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929171 
154  See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 
(2002); DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT:  KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004).  
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel note more generally that “[t]he antiabortion backlash 
that has so traumatized liberals reflects a constitutional vision that would preserve traditional 
family roles and resist secularization of the American state.”  Post and Seigel, supra note __,  at 
55. 
155 See, e.g., Caroline A. Placey, Comment, Of Judicial  Bypass Procedures, Moral Recual, and 
Protected Political Speech:  Throwing Pregnancy Minors Under the Campaign Bus, 56 EMORY 
L. J. 693, 703-04 (2006); Posting  of  Professor Kimberly Murcherson to 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_parental-notification0306.msp. 
156 Stanley K. Henshaw, and Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortion 
Decisions, 24 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES,  196, 213(Sept.-Oct., 1992).  
157 For example, the American Association of University Women maintains that: "While the 
intent of such laws is to enhance family communication, the failure to guarantee confidentiality 
often deters young people from seeking timely services and care resulting in increased instances 
of sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and late term abortions."  Auriana 
Ojeda,  Should Abortion Rights Be Restricted?: Introduction, enotes.com (2002) 
<http://www.enotes.com/should-abortion-article/39731>.; see also Rachel N. Pine, Speculation 
and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
655, 677-90 (1987) (summarizing research that shows ineffective parent-teen communications 
about matters of sexuality and that assumptions underlying parental notification laws are 
unrealistic).  In Hodgson v. Minnesota, the trial court, after a lengthy hearing on implication of 
that state’s parental notification law, found that:  
the two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful effects on both the minor and 
the custodial parent when the parents were divorced or separated, especially in the context of an 
abusive or dysfunctional family; that the requirement also had adverse effects in families in 
which the minor lives with both parents, particularly where family violence is a serious problem; 
that the requirement actually impairs family communication in many instances, since minors 
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opponents maintain that in the polarized climate of abortion politics, such laws 
are often intended to frustrate access to abortion services altogether.158 
 
 In the period immediately following Roe v. Wade, parental involvement 
laws swept the country.159  By 1988, over twenty states had enacted legislation, 
though about half were subject to court orders enjoining their enforcement.160   
Relatively liberal Massachusetts enacted one of the first (and strictest) statutes 
in 1974.161   Today, forty-four states have at one time or another enacted such 
laws, and thirty-five states have them in force.162  Although initially neither 
abortion nor parental notification laws split the states along lines of red 
state/blue state polarization, more recent developments do, in fact, echo this 
split.163 
 
 The litigation over the constitutionality of the laws captures some of the 
shift.  In 1976, the Supreme Court first considered parental involvement laws, 
striking down a Missouri statute that required parental consent, unless the 
abortion was necessary to save the life of the child.164  In subsequent cases, the 
Court has upheld statutes requiring parental consent, so long as they include a 
judicial bypass procedure that would allow a mature minor to make her own 
abortion decision, or that would permit an abortion to occur if it were in the 
child’s best interest.165   These early cases balanced protection of the 
constitutional right to abortion with the recognition ordinarily granted to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
who otherwise would inform one parent were unwilling to do so when such notification would 
involve going to court for a bypass in any event; that few minors can take advantage of the 
abuse exception because of the obligation to report the information to the authorities and the 
attendant loss of privacy; and that the two-parent requirement did not further the State's interests 
in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity. 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 421 (1990). 
158 See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 
INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 305 (2004) (statutes serve, inter alia, to make access to abortion more 
difficult for minors).  
159 For further discussion of the Roe backlash, see Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. ___  (forthcoming 2007) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990968. 
160 Theresa N. Walker, Note, California's Parental Consent Statute: A Constitutional Challenge, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 169 n. 4 (1988) (23 states had enacted either parental notification or 
consent laws; 9 were subject to injunction and 3 had been declared unconstitutional.) 
161 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12P (2003).  The Massachusetts statute required the 
consent, not just the notification, of both parents. 
162  Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Consent or Notification for Minors. 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news-articles-press/politics-policy-issues/teen-pregnancy-
sex-education/consent-law-6132.htm 
163 See H.W. Perry, Jr. and L.A. Powe, Jr ,  The Political Battle for the Constitution, , 21 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 641 (2004)(summarizing the political shifts and timing the start of the political 
polarization on the issue to the Reagan years).  See also Post and Siegel, supra note ___, at 55 
(summarizing research on the anti-abortion movement and concluding that opposition to Roe 
was largely a Catholic effort in the seventies and early eighties, and that evangelicals and 
mainstream Protestants did not initially view abortion as an important issue). 
164 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
165 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992). 
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parents’ interest in supervising their teens.  In the Court’s 1976 decision in 
Bellotti v. Baird,166 for example, which struck down the Massachusetts statute, 
Justice Powell observed that the abortion decision was crucial to a minor’s 
future, and that the state must have important interests when seeking to restrict a 
minor’s choice.167   In contrast to later decisions, the Court in Bellotti  focused 
on the right to an abortion, the potential impact of parental notification on 
deterring abortion, and what it clearly viewed as the negative consequences, 
“grave and indelible,” of “unwanted motherhood” balanced against the parental 
interest in supervising their children.168 
 
 By 1990, however, the Court had become warier of overturning state 
decisions, and it fractured in Hodgson v. Minnesota,169 overturning a two-parent 
involvement law that Justice Powell described as one of the strictest in the 
country,170 but doing so in a plurality opinion later courts would find 
incomprehensible.171 In the Supreme Court’s most recent parental involvement 
decision, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England,172 the Court declined 
to invalidate a New Hampshire statute on its face that required parental 
                                                          
166  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
167 He noted: 
We are concerned here with a constitutional right to seek an abortion. The abortion 
decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority. 
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion 
decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity 
when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter . . . . Indeed, considering her 
probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, 
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor . . . . In sum, there 
are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will 
have consequences so grave and indelible. 
Id. at  642. 
168 Justice Powell observed that: "Properly understood . . . the tradition of parental authority is 
not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic 
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the 
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make 
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638-
639 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
169 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), 
170 Stevens wrote that “Minnesota['s] statute is the most intrusive in the Nation" because it is the 
only state - of the thirty-eight which require some form of participation by the minor's parents - 
to specifically mandate that both parents of the pregnant woman consent to the abortion. Id. at 
425 n.5 (discussing the varying requirements from state to state for a woman who seeks an 
abortion). Many of the individual justices joined the other justices in part with six upholding the 
constitutionality of single parent notification with judicial bypass procedures, and five 
upholding the constitutionality of two parent notification with sufficient judicial bypass 
safeguards.  The trial court, in Hodgson, however, in addition to its findings that the two parent 
notification served no rational state purpose, also found bypass procedures to be terrifying to the 
petitioners, with many judges concluding that they were pointless.  Id. at  
171 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998). "The Court in 
Hodgson was so fractured as to render its opinions collectively all but impenetrable, with five 
different Justices filing opinions variously concurring and dissenting in other opinions and parts 
of other opinions...." 
172 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
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notification without a judicial bypass.  Instead, the Court emphasized that 
relatively few applications of the statute would raise constitutional issues, and 
that the Court should “try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is 
necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent 
of the elected representatives of the people.’”173 
 
 As partisanship has intensified around the issue of abortion, the Court 
has signaled that the issue is better left to the political branches of government.  
In Gonzales v. Carhart,174 which upheld federal partial birth abortion 
legislation, the Court reaffirmed its deference to legislative judgment.  As a 
result, the matter of parental involvement is now clearly in the hands of state 
legislatures, with less expectation than in prior decades that the Court will police 
state activity.175   
 
 In state legislatures, the red/blue division is replicated.  Six states, all of 
which are blue—Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington—do not require any form of parental involvement in minors’ 
abortion decisions.177 New Hampshire, the battleground New England state, 
became the first state to repeal a parental notification during the summer of 
2007.178 The experience in New Hampshire emphasizes the politically polarized 
nature of the issue.  The 2007 repeal came after Democrats swept into office in 
the 2006 election, replacing the Republican legislature that had passed strict – 
and arguably unconstitutional – parental notification laws only a few years 
before.179  West coast blue California and Oregon had parental notification 
propositions on the ballot in 2006.  California voters, who had overthrown a 
similar measure in a 2005 special election, defeated the proposition again in 
2006.180  Oregon defeated its parental notification proposition, which would 
                                                          
173 Id. at 329 (citations omitted). 
174 Gonzales v. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
175 See, e.g., Perry and Powe,  supra note __ , observing that legislatures in the era immediately 
after Roe sometimes passed legislation with the expectation that the Court would invalid it, 
taking the political heat away from the legislature for the decision. 
177  Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Notification, supra note __.  Connecticut 
provides for counseling the teen about the possibility of parental notification, but does not 
mandate it. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-600 to -601 (West, 2007). 
178 New Hampshire to Repeal Parental Notification Law, N. Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007. 
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F20B13FB34540C7B8CDDAF0894DF40
4482. 
179 Id.  The Ayotte Court observed that the failure to provide an exception to the parental 
notification provision to protect the life or health of the mother raised potential constitutional 
issues and remanded for a determination of whether an injunction would cure the problem.  
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
180 The California legislature had enacted a parental involvement statute in 1987, which was 
subsequently declared unconstitutional pursuant to the state’s constitutional  right to privacy in 
1997.  See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (striking down 
California's law because it offended the minor's right of privacy guaranteed by the California 
constitution).  The Proposition failed in 2006 by a vote of 46% to 54%.  AMERICAVOTES2006, 
CNN.COM. HTTP://WWW.CNN.COM/ELECTION/2006/PAGES/RESULTS/BALLOT.MEASURES/ 
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have changed state law allowing teens fifteen and older to obtain abortions 
without parental involvement, by a similar margin.181 
 
  Some states, while mandating notification or consent, make them less of a 
barrier to obtaining an abortion.  The majority of these states are blue.  Maine, 
for example, allows a physician to override the parental involvement 
requirement and permits other family members to be notified in lieu of a 
parent.182  Other states have relatively broad waiver provisions, including the 
blue states of Delaware and Maryland, and red West Virginia that like Maine 
allow a physician to waive parental notice in the best interests of the child.183  A 
few states, blue and red, have also broadened the class of adults who can 
consent or to whom notice must be given in lieu of a parent.184  Finally, some 
states have taken no state action the wake of older decisions invalidating 
parental notification statutes.185 
                                                          
181 Id. 
182 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597-A(2)(A)(West, 2007) 
183 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (1997) (allowing notice to a licensed mental health 
professional not associated with an abortion provider); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
103(c) (2007) (allowing a physician to determine that parental notice is not in the minor's best 
interest); and W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 (stating physician not affiliated with an abortion provider 
may waive the notice requirement). Kansas also permits physician waiver but only in the event 
of a medical emergency.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(j) (2007) (allowing a physician to bypass 
parental notice in cases where the physician determines that an emergency exists that threatens 
the “well-being” of the minor). 
184 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.375(2)(b)(West, WESTLAW through 2005 Act 60)(in lieu 
of parental consent, a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling who is at least 25 years old may 
provide consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 2007) (stating that notice may 
be given to a brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications are met).  Some 
states broaden the class of adults to include other family members, such as grandparents, with 
whom the teen is living, but we view the purpose of these laws as less about parental authority.  
See Planned Parenthood, Laws Requiring Parental Notification, supra note __. 
185 Planned Parenthood lists nine states where courts have issued injunctions against 
enforcement of their parental notification laws.  Of these states, four (California, Illinois, New 
Hampshire, and New Jersey) are blue, though New Hampshire is a battleground state, and the 
remaining five are red (Alaska, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, and Nevada), with Nevada and 
New Mexico battleground states.  In the four blue states, none of the state laws have been 
reinstated through legislative action, despite the fact that the injunctions were issued  some time 
ago.  Indeed, California voters rejected a parental notification proposition and New Hampshire 
repealed its parental notification law after the Supreme Court decision in Ayotte.  See note __ 
supra; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (finding 
the law violated the state's constitution, no further action taken);  Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 C 771 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1996) (finding state notification statute unconstitutional because of lack of 
judicial bypass procedure).  In the five red states, three states (including the battleground states 
of Nevada and New Mexico and mountain west Montana) have taken no further action; Alaska 
moved promptly to reinstate the law and Idaho is appealing the injunction.  See Wicklund v. 
State, No. ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 12, 1999) appeal dismissed (Mont. Nov. 29, 1999) 
(law is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates the equal protection clause of the 
Montana Constitution by infringing, without adequate justification, the privacy rights of 
pregnant young women who wish to terminate their pregnancies);  see also N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. 
No. 90-19 (Oct. 3, 1990) (finding notification statute unconstitutional in 1990, no further action 
taken); Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (preliminary injunction upheld), No. CV-




 Taking these developments together, the blue states as a whole look 
different from the red states.  Of the nineteen states that voted for Kerry in 2004, 
almost a third (six) have no parental involvement statutes.186  A seventh, New 
Hampshire, repealed its law, the only state to do so.   Three have had their state 
statutes declared unconstitutional, and declined to enact alternative measures 
(with California having defeated propositions that would do so two years in a 
row), for a total of ten with no enforcement whatsoever.187  Four additional 
states have softened the impact of their parental involvement statutes through 
physician waivers or an expansion of the adults who can act in place of 
parents.188  This leaves five of the nineteen states with relatively strict laws 
intact: Massachusetts,189 Minnesota,190 Rhode Island,191 Pennsylvania,192 and 
Michigan.193  None of these more restrictive statutes, however, has been enacted 
since 2000. 
 
 All of the thirty-one red states, in contrast, have enacted parental 
notification statutes Twenty-five of these states have strict parental notification 
                                                                                                                                                                             
N-85-331-ECR (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 1991) (permanent injunction issued); Planned Parenthood v. 
State, 3AN-97-6014 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2003).  That decision is currently being 
appealed by the state to the Alaska Supreme Court.  Planned Parenthood v. State, S-11365 
(Alaska Feb. 17, 2004) (appeal filed).  In March 2007, Idaho enacted a new parental consent law 
to replace previous versions of the statute which the courts had held were  unconstitutional and 
unenforceable.  Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 926 (9th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, No. 04-703 (Mar. 28, 2005) (unconstitutional and unenforceable because the 
statute contained an inadequate medical emergency exception to protect a young woman's 
health).  In Florida, by contrast,  following a decision that an earlier parental notification statute 
was unconstitutional in N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv. v. State, 866 So. 2d (Fla. 
2003), the state amended its constitution to reinstate such a requirement. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
390.01114 (West 2006) (enacted following a constitutional amendment by referendum that 
would permit parental notification without violating the minor's state constitutional right of 
privacy, as long as the parental notification contained certain exceptions and a judicial bypass.). 
186 These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. 
187 California rejected such a proposition at the polls, Illinois has yet to adopt a judicial bypass 
process a decade after the original ruling and New Jersey has taken no action after seven years.    
188 The four states are Maine, Delaware, Maryland and Wisconsin.  Delaware, however, only 
requires parental involvement for teens under 16.  Planned Parenthood, Parental Notication 
Laws, supra note __.  Carol Sanger emphasizes that the contrast between nuanced consent laws 
for medical care, including contraceptive use, and the blanket consent or notification 
requirements for abortion underscores the politicized nature of these enactments.  Sanger,  
Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __,  at 307 (“The sweep of coverage suggests from the 
start that parental involvement statutes focus not on adolescence as a stage of development but 
rather on minority as a site of control.”)  
189 The Massachusetts law, which originally required the consent of both parents, was limited to 
one parent and upheld in Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, 677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1997). 
190 Minnesota’s restrictive law was upheld in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
191 See  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23- 4.7-6 (enacted 1982) 
192 The state’s parental consent law was upheld in Planned Parenthood of SE Pa.  v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
193 Michigan’s parental consent law was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Mid-Michigan, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, No. D 91-0571 AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 1994). 
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or consent statutes, while six have less stringent laws.194   Moreover, two red 
states, Mississippi195 and North Dakota,196 mandate that both parents consent.197   
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming require both parental consent and 
notification.198 
     
 Parental notification statutes—and the fight to enact or repeal them—
reinforce the distinctions between the two family systems described above.  
Carol Sanger suggests that “parental involvement statutes, while often couched 
in the language of family togetherness and child protection, are less concerned 
with developing sound or nuanced family policies in the area of adolescent 
reproduction than with securing a set of political goals aimed at thwarting access 
to abortion, restoring parental authority, and punishing girls for having sex.”199  
Empirical research, while imperfect, concurs that parental involvement laws are 
more important in discouraging abortion than in promoting individual teen 
health or family communications.200   We believe parental notification laws are 
different because they address the linchpin of the two family systems we have 
described.  The blue state system rests on sexual autonomy and delayed 
childbearing.  While delayed adulthood might suggest less room for adolescent 
decision-making, few things would more quickly derail blue state adolescence 
than an improvident birth.  Accordingly, acknowledging teen immaturity makes 
the abortion that much more important to secure.201 
 
 The red state system places more of a premium in channeling teens from 
childhood into adulthood without a period of independence.202   Autonomy is 
less important even in adulthood, and authority is more critical.  George Lakoff, 
                                                          
194  In three red states – Montana, New Mexico, and Nevada - the laws have been enjoined and 
no further action has been taken.  Two more, West Virginia and Ohio, permit waivers or the 
expansion of the adults who can act in lieu of parents.  An additional state lowers the age of 
mandatory parental involvement to teens younger than 17 and permits grandparents acting in 
loco parentis to take the place of the parents S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-10(m), (n) (original 
statute enacted 1990),  -30 (enacted 1990), -31 to -37 (enacted 1990). 
195 See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); Pro-
Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998). 
196 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-03.1 (enacted 1981), 14-02.1-03 (enacted 1975), 14-02.1-02 
(Enacted 1975; Last Amended 1995), 14-02.1-02.1 (Enacted 1991). 
197 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’ ABORTIONS, STATE POL’Y IN 
BRIEF (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.   
198 Planned Parenthood, Parental Notification Laws, supra note __. 
199 Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __, at 307. 
200 See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Empirical Research on Parental Involvement Laws 
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors, 2007). 
201 Of course, for those who object to abortion per se on moral grounds, the practical 
consequences are irrelevant; nonetheless, parental notification assumes the availability of 
abortion as a permissible choice. The major effects of the parental notification laws has been to 
delay the abortion, with health consequences for teens. See Guttmacher, Parental Involvement, 
supra note __. 
202  Indeed, given the absence of full cognitive maturity throughout the teen years, any system 
that provides for the assumption of adult responsibilities before that age is likely to do so in the 
context of social channeling rather than independent action. 
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in his study of differences in American cultural styles, emphasizes the 
distinction what he terms “the strict father” and “the nurturing mother” in styles 
of communication.203  Parental notification statutes reaffirm the primacy of 
parental authority,204 with, as Sanger suggests, a subtext of punishment for sex 
within a cultural context that also places more emphasis on punishment and 
redemption.205  The result is to reinforce different family formation strategies in 
the two systems. 
 
 B.   Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 Same-sex marriage and, indeed, recognition of same-sex relationships 
more generally inspired Justice Scalia’s reference to a “culture war,” and few 
issues are more polarizing.206  Nonetheless, recognition of same-sex 
relationships, like parental involvement laws, is an evolving process.207  
Relatively liberal states, like California, voted overwhelmingly for a proposition 
defining marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman in 2000, and 
then a short time later elected a Democratic legislature that adopted a broad 
domestic partnership statute without much fanfare.208  The intensity of the issue 
in recent years has been tied in part to a Republican political strategy of placing 
anti-same-sex marriage initiatives on the ballot as a way of increasing the 
fundamentalist turnout.209  That strategy may have helped seal the outcome of 
                                                          
203 GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE 
DEBATE (2004); MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2002) 
[hereinafter MORAL POLITICS].  
 204 Lakoff emphasizes that within a strict father universe, children are “born bad” and learn 
through punishment. Interview by Bonnie Powell with George Lakoff (2003), 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml; see also Martin 
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 639 
(2002)(“The abortion cases are simply a use of state power to reorder society, shifting power 
over children from parents to judges when it serves an instrumental value wholly apart from a 
child's rights. . . . For those minors who, for whatever reason, choose not to seek parental 
consent, a new adult was vested with the power over them.”). 
205 Of course, Lakoff further observes that within such a system, abortion may not be 
appropriate at all.  “According to Strict Father morality, an unmarried teenage girl should not be 
having teenage sex at all. . . . She has to be responsible for the consequence of her actions if she 
is to learn from her mistakes.  An abortion would simply sanction her immoral behavior.”  
MORAL POLITICS, supra note ___, at 267-68.  If abortion is not appropriate, however, it is also 
less of a concern that parental notification statutes may delay or frustrate the procedure. 
206 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
207 See, e.g., http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_poll2.htm (discussing poll that asked,  "Do 
you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?”,   
and documenting the increase in the percent saying these relations should be legal from 43% in 
June 1977 to 60% in June 2003) 
208 http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marl3.htm.  It received 61.4% of the vote.  
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE.ORG.  TWO CALIFORNIA LAWS REGARDING SEXUAL MINORITIES.  
209 See, e.g., RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S 
POLARIZED POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady eds., 2006) (evaluating claims of 
polarization, and distinguishing between polarized parties and public attitudes); 
Wayne Baker, Purple America (2005) 
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/wayneb/Purple%20America%20June%202005.pdf  (emphasizing 
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the 2004 election, and increased the visibility of same-sex issues within the 
political system.210 
  
 National politics aside, however, divisions on same-sex marriage also 
involve central parts of the two family systems we have charted above.  The first 
is the difference between marriage as an institution designed to facilitate 
commitment and companionship versus marriage as an institution uniquely 
designed to promote the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing.211   The 
Religious Coalition for Marriage argues, for example, that marriage provides the 
optimal setting for childrearing, as children do best with a mother and a father.  
Consequently, “when marriage is entered into and gotten out of lightly, when it 
is no longer the boundary of sexual activity, or when it is allowed to be radically 
redefined, a host of personal and civic ills can be expected to follow.”212  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that there is greater polarization among the political parties and political activists than among the 
public as a whole.); 
210 Debra Rosenberg and Karen Breslau, Culture Wars: Winning the “Values” Vote, NEWSWEEK 
CAMPAIGN 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6401635/site/newsweek/.  But see Gregory B. 
Lewis, Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 POL. SCI. & POLITICS. page, 
195-9 (2005) (suggesting other issues may have been more critical to the outcome).  See also 
Post and Siegel, supra note 25, at 56, n.232 (emphasizing that conservative groups see abortion 
and same-sex marriage as essentially the same issue).   
211 For articulation of these two positions, see Douglas W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of 
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 949, 951-954 (2006). (draft at 8);  see 
also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AS MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS 
CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 27 (2007), 
http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/Marriage.pdf (finding that only 41% of Americans find 
children important to making a marriage worked in 2007 compared to 55% in 1993.  By 
contrast, sharing household chores and having a happy sexual relationship have become more 
important, with 62 and 70%, respectively, citing those factors as important to a successful 
marriage).  When asked “which is closer to your views about the main purpose of marriage? 
Forming a lifetime union between two adults for mutual happiness and fulfillment or for bearing 
and raising children,” 65% chose mutual happiness and fulfillment, 23% chose bearing and 
raising children, and 7% said both.  Id. at 29. 
212 RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, A LETTER FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS LEADERS 
IN DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE (2006), http://www.nhclc.org/about/pdf/defenseofmarriage.doc.  See 
also Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution:  A 
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33 (2005).  She does not want to be 
misunderstood as saying that: 
 “marriage is in order to produce children.”  Marriage is not a factory for childbearing. . . . 
Marriage as a universal social institution is grounded In certain universal features of human 
nature.  When men and women have sex, they make babies . . .  
. . . Marriage intrinsically aims at an enduring, exclusive, sexual union between a man and a 
woman, because managing the procreative consequences of human sexual attraction is at 
the core of its reason for existence. 
Id. at 44, 46. 
For articulation of the religious position in favor of recognition of same-sex marriage, see David 
Myers and Letha Scanzoni, WHAT GOD HAS JOINED TOGETHER: A CHRISTIAN CASE FOR GAY 
MARRIAGE (2005).  Letha Scanzoni is active in the Evangelical and Ecumenical Women’s 
Caucus.  http://www.eewc.com/Update/Fall2003Contemporaneity.htm 
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Closely related to the role of marriage as maximizing child development 
is its role as a “boundary of sexual activity.”  Accordingly,   the Religious 
Coalition for Marriage finds gay marriage  particularly threatening to the 
concept of faithfulness in marriage because gay men are less likely to value 
sexual fidelity than are lesbians or married people.213   Indeed, while Americans 
generally support the ideal of marital fidelity, they differ in the importance they 
attach to regulation of sexuality in other contexts – and in the importance of 
channeling sexual activity into marriage.214 
 
 Differences in worldview exacerbate differences in the understanding of 
the marital ideal.  Poll data indicates for example that 55% of Americans believe 
that homosexuality is a “sin,” and that these views are more strongly held by 
evangelicals (76%).215  Moreover, while the country is evenly divided on 
whether homosexuality can be changed, evangelicals and those with 
conservative political beliefs are substantially more likely to find that 
homosexuality is a matter of lifestyle choice.216   Indeed, negative attitudes 
                                                          
213 RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, TOP 10 SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
SAME SEX MARRIAGE  (2006);  see also Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the 
Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 812 (2006) (“Marriage is at once powerful to confer 
legal privileges and to shield people from the dangers of sexual illicitness, and powerless to 
protect itself from the taint of those very illicit practices.”).  On the other hand, several studies 
refute the idea that gay men are much more promiscuous than heterosexual men.  Rauch, supra 
not __ , at 143; DALE CARPENTER, THE MYTH OF GAY PROMISCUITY (2003), 
http://www.marriagedebate.com/2003/08/myth-of-gay-promiscuity-dale-carpenter.htm.  Based 
on his research, Eugene Volokh noted on his blog:  “gay and bisexual males (defined as having 
had at least one same-sex relationship in the last 5 years) have an average (not a median) of 
26.6+/-11.5 lifetime sexual partners compared to an average of 16.9+/-3 for straights. . .  the 
GSS dataset . . .  reports that the median for gay and bisexual men is about 10, compared to a 
median for straight men of about 6.” The Volokh Conspiracy,  
http://volokh.com/2003_05_18_volokh_archive.html#200329250. 
214 Linguist George Lakoff observes:  
[T]ake gay marriage, which the right has made a rallying topic. Surveys have been done that say 
Americans are overwhelmingly against gay marriage. Well, the same surveys show that they 
also overwhelmingly object to discrimination against gays. These seem to be opposite facts, but 
they're not. "Marriage" is about sex. When you say "gay marriage," it becomes about gay sex, 
and approving of gay marriage becomes implicitly about approving of gay sex.. 
Bonnie Azab Powell, Framing the Issues: UC Berkeley Professor George Lakoff Tells How 
Conservatives Use Language to Dominate Politics, UCBerkeleyNews,  Oct. 27, 2003, 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml.  The Pew Research 
Center, for example, while it found that the public continues to emphasize fidelity in marriage 
(93% rate it as important to a successful marriage), also found that 59% believe that a couples 
having sexual relations before marrying is either either not wrong at all or only sometimes 
wrong.  Pew Research Center, supra note __,  at 3. 
215 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN 
OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY (2003), http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37. 
216 Id. Twice as many liberals as conservatives say that people are born homosexual. In addition, 
“73% of committed white evangelicals think homosexuals can change their sexual orientation; 
61% of black Protestants agree. By comparison, 54% of white Catholics and half of white 
mainline Protestants think homosexuals cannot change their orientation, a view shared by two-
thirds (66%) of seculars.”  Id.  See also Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From 
the Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 (2000). 
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toward homosexuality tend to correspond with red/blue divisions more 
generally.  The most negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians, for example, 
are held in the South, the least negative in the East, more negative in rural than 
urban areas, by those with more conservative political beliefs, and by the least 
educated.217  A major study further found “homosexuality in general not merely 
the contentious issue of gay marriage is a major topic in churches and other 
houses of worship. In fact, clergy are nearly as likely to address homosexuality 
from the pulpit as they are to speak out about abortion or prayer in school.”218   
 
 In what we term blue state family values, in contrast, greater emphasis is 
placed on equality, empathy and tolerance.219  As a matter of secular reason, 
“sin” disappears from the lexicon, and increasing majorities in the country as a 
whole disapprove of the criminalization of consenting sexual activity between 
adults.220   Marriage is no longer associated with hierarchal authority or the 
gendered assignment of family roles,221 and instead becomes a matter of choice 
designed to express love and commitment. 222  Within this tradition, recognition 
                                                          
217 PEW FORUM, supra note 193. 
218 Id. “The clergy in evangelical churches focus considerably more attention on homosexuality  
and address it far more negatively  than do ministers and priests in other denominations. Two-
thirds of evangelical Protestants who attend church services at least once a month say their 
ministers speak out on homosexual issues, compared with only about half of Catholics (49%) 
and just a third of mainline Protestants (33%). And compared with others who attend services 
where homosexuality is discussed, substantially more evangelicals (86%) say the message they 
are receiving is that homosexuality should be discouraged, not accepted.” 
219 See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 
270-71 (1997) (noting a shift in moral values, placing greater emphasis on gender equity as a 
“primary objective,” and individual rights “within the contexts of community, equality, and 
commitment.”);.Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 
(2006). 
220 Religious tolerance, supra.  See also AEI Studies in Public Opinion, Attitudes About 
Homosexuality and Gay Marriage (2004), 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050121_HOMOSEXUALITY.pdf (summarizing poll results that 
find between 57% and 74% disapprove of criminal sanctions against homosexuality depending 
on the polls same and wording). 
221 But see  MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND 
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (forthcoming 
2008) (manuscript on file with authors); KATHERINE FRANKE, EMANCIPATION 
APPROXIMATION (forthcoming)(manuscript on file with authors).  
222 See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE:  WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR 
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICAN 6 (2004).   Similarly, the Pew Research Center study 
found that the overwhelming majority of Americans choose companionship over procreation as 
the principal purpose of marriage.  Pew Research Center, supra note __.  The study did not 
provide a regional breakdown, but it did find Latinos more likely than whites to rank children 
more highly as a purpose of marriage.  69% ranked children “very important” to a successful 
marriage compared to 35% of whites and 49% of blacks.  Nonetheless, even Latinos chose 
companionship over children as the “main purpose” of marriage, albeit by smaller margins (51 
to 38% as opposed to 67 to 21% for whites, and 63 to 23% for blacks. Id. at 8.  Regular church 
goers chose companionship over raising children by 58 to 25% while those attending less 
regularly or not at all chose companionship over children by 74 to 18%.  Id. at 7. 
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of same-sex relationships becomes a matter of basic equality,223 and inclusion of 
gay and lesbian relationships within marriage a symbol of the institution’s 
transformation from its more patriarchal past.224  The cultural meaning of same-
sex marriage within the well-educated, secular, urban coasts differs dramatically 
from its context within the still closeted, more rural, evangelical Midwest and 
South.225 
 
 We also suspect that age of family formation intersects with tolerance 
toward homosexuality to reinforce these differences.  As the movie “Brokeback 
Mountain” illustrates, youthful marriages often occur before young adults have 
fully worked through their own sexuality.   As a result, family members may 
first become aware of homosexual behavior in the context of divorce.  In areas 
of the country that are more supportive of gay and lesbian relationships, or 
among groups that marry later, sexual orientation and identity is more likely to 
be firmly established before entry into a long- term relationship.226  Same-sex 
relationships in these regions are thus coded as part of a fight for recognition 
rather than an association with infidelity and family crisis.227 
                                                          
223 The state judicial decisions that have required recognition of same-sex marriage, civil unions, 
or domestic partnerships have all turned on equal rights analysis.   See Goodridge v. Mass. 
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 
2006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). In Washington, while the court 
declined to find that the state constitution mandated recognition of same-sex marriage, also used 
an equal rights framework for analysis, though it emphasized judicial restraint and the failure to 
establish a suspect class.  Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).  In 
contrast, the New York decision in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), based its 
analysis rejecting recognition of same-sex marriage on the distinctive relationship between 
marriage and procreation. 
224 Indeed, marriage reassumes its traditional role in channeling sexual expression and 
restraining promiscuity.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 8-9 (1996); see generally, 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE AND DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE:  FOR BETTER OR FOR 
WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE  LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006). 
225 We acknowledge that substantial hostility toward gays and lesbians and toward same-sex 
marriage exists in blue-states as well.  Nonetheless, polls show greater movement of attitudes in 
those states.  In addition, there is a substantial difference between Catholics, who often dominate 
in the Northeast and upper and industrial Midwest on these issues, and evangelical Protestants.  
Catholics are much more likely to view homosexuality as something that can’t be changed and 
Catholic clergy, who are more likely than Protestant clergy to emphasize abortion, are less likely 
to discuss homosexuality.  The Pew Forum, supra note 193. 
226 See, e.g., TAN (cases discussed in the next section).  Family law cases addressing 
homosexuality have overwhelmingly involved  disputes between divorcing couples where same-
sex attraction was a factor in custody and visitation determinations.  Today, a larger number of 
cases, particularly in blue states, involve the separation of same-sex partners.  See, e.g., 
Chambers v. Ormiston, Case No. 06-340-M.P., pending before the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
(one of the authors of this article is a signatory to an amicus brief in this case which involves 
whether a Rhode Island court can dissolve a Massachusetts same-sex marriage).  See 
http://www.glad.org/GLAD_Cases/Amici/Chambers_Ormiston/GLAD.pdf. 
227 See infra TAN (discussing the change over time from cases that focused on custody and 
visitation in divorce actions involving  one parent’s acknowledgment of a same-sex relationship 
to cases focusing on recognition of same-sex partners who have jointly parented a child). 
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 Given these differences, it would be remarkable if same-sex marriage 
were not a politically contentious issue, even within blue states.228  These states 
differ most from red states in the degree of change in attitudes over the last three 
decades.  In the period from 1973 to 2002, the percentage of the country as a 
whole responding yes to the question  “Are homosexual relations always 
wrong?” dropped 18% points.  The groups dropping most dramatically were 
younger (especially those 30 to 44), Democrats and Independents rather than 
Republicans (who dropped by only 9 points), those attending church once a 
month as opposed to both the more and less religious,229 and those in the 
Northeast (23%) as opposed to the South (13%).230 
 
Recognition of same-sex relationships follows greater tolerance toward 
homosexuality more generally.  One state, the bluest of blue states, recognizes 
same-sex marriage.231  Five states – all blue – recognize civil unions or domestic 
partnerships that are the equivalent of marriage.232  Three states and the District 
of Columbia – all blue – provide some statewide rights to same-sex couples 
falling short of marriage.233  Altogether, nine of the nineteen blue states – and 
none of the red states -- extend at least some legislative recognition to same-sex 
couples. 
 
 At the other end of the spectrum, thirty-three states now have statutory 
bans on marriage for same-sex couples – overwhelmingly as a result of 
propositions place on the ballot between 2004 and 2006.234  Three (Alaska, 
                                                          
228 Although the number of people who “strongly oppose” gay marriage in March 2006 – 28% -- 
has decreased from its high of 42% in February 2004, and although the overwhelming majority 
of Americans support equality for gays and lesbians, a majority remains against gay marriage 
nationally. See William Saletan, Gay-Marriage Proposal, WASH. POST, April 30, 2006, at B2.  
Nonetheless, the most recent polls see the public split almost 50-50 on the issue of Civil Unions, 
down from the majority that had supported them earlier.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 
__, at 48. 
229 Those attending church once a month dropped from 72% to 46%, compared with those 
attending once a week who dropped from 84%  to 79% and those attending once a year or less, 
who dropped from 63% to 46%.  AEI, supra note __. 
230 Id.  The Northeast fell from 64 to 41%; the South from 84 to 71%. 
231 See Goodridge v. Mass. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 207 (2007) 
232 Vermont (civil unions, 2001);Connecticut (civil unions, 2005);California (domestic 
partnerships, last amended in 2006); New Hampshire (civil unions, effective January 2008);New 
Jersey (civil unions, 2007); Oregon (domestic partnerships, effective January 2008).  HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Relationship Recognition in the U.S., 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManagement
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16305 (updated May 31, 2007) 
233 Id. Hawaii (reciprocal beneficiaries, 1997); Maine (domestic partnerships, 2004); 
Washington State (domestic partnerships, July 2007); District of Columbia (domestic 
partnerships, implemented in 2002).  See also Leslie Harris, Same-Sex Unions Around the 
World:  Marriage, Civil Unions, Registered Partnerships—What are the Differences and Why 
do the Matter?, 19 PROBATE & PROPERTY 31, 33 (Sept/Oct 2005) 
234 http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf.   
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Nebraska, and Nevada) had constitutional provisions limiting marriage to a 
relationship between a man and a woman before 2004.235  Two (Louisiana and 
Missouri) adopted such an amendment in early 2004.236  Eleven more states 
adopted such amendments on November 2, 2004: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and 
Utah.237  Kansas and Texas added such amendments in 2005.238  Alabama did so 
in early 2006. Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin passed additional amendments banning same-sex 
marriage in November, 2006, with voters in Arizona rejecting such a proposal in 
their state.239  Moreover, the amendments in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Idaho, Oklahoma, 
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Utah also 
have language that may limit civil unions or domestic partnerships.240  Twenty-
four of the twenty-six states with such amendments are red, and six of the seven 
remaining red states (as well as twelve of the blue states) have statutes limiting 
marriage to a relationship between a man and a woman.241 
 
The only red state not to ban same-sex marriage through either a 
constitutional amendment or legislation is New Mexico; its legislature has 
repeatedly refused to enact such provisions.242  Of the blue states, only Rhode 
                                                          
235 The Alaska Constituion states: "To be valid or recognized in this state, a marriage may exist 
only between one man and one woman." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; the Nebraska Constitution 
provides: "Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. 
The uniting of two persons of the same-sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other 
similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska." NEB. CONST.  art. 1, 
§ 29; and in Nevada, the constitution states:   "Only a marriage between a male and female shall 
be recognized and given effect in this state."  NEV. CONST.  art. 1, § 21 
236 Julie L. Davies, Family Law Chapter:  Sate Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 1079, 1086 (2006). 
237 Id. at 1087.  
238 Id. 
239 Stateline.org, Tetons Handily Press Gay Marriage Ban (Nov. 7, 2005) 
240 State Prohibitions on Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Nov. 
2006, 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/Conte
ntManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm.  These provisions vary, but they are potentially more 
immediate in their impact.  While few of the states banning same-sex marriage were likely to 
recognize such marriages even without the amendments, a number of states might have provided 
other recognition to same-sex couples.  The Ohio Supreme Court recently resolved a dispute 
between lower state courts as to whether a domestic violence criminal conviction violates the 
Ohio Defense of Marriage Act to the extent it criminalizes abuse committed against a nonmarital 
(same-sex or heterosexual) partner.   State v. Carswell, 2007 Ohio LEXIS 1654 (July 25, 2007). 
241  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATE RECOGNITION. A number of the blue states, however, 
including California, Connecticut, Oregon, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and 
Washington, provide recognition to domestic partnerships, civil unions or reciprocal 
beneficiaries.  None of the red states do. 
242 Religious Tolerance, supra, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marrnm.htm.  Studies of 
attitudes toward homosexuality generally indicate that Hispanics are more tolerant than whites 
or blacks, id. at 4, and that Catholics are more tolerant than Protestants. Id. at 5.  In contrast, 
Catholic priests place greater emphasis in the pulpit on abortion than do Protestant ministers.  Id. 
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Island has neither banned same-sex marriage nor adopted some recognition for 
same couples.  The other states, however, without effective statutory 
prohibitions are blue: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont.243   
 
C.  Non-marital Cohabitation in Custody Cases 
 
 If same-sex marriage and anything connected to abortion are among the 
most polarizing family law issues of the day, what about the more prosaic issues 
of family law decision-making?  Do red-blue distinction matter only when the 
press and politicians are involved?  To assess that question, we also examine a 
quieter issue, albeit one likely to affect a potentially larger number of litigants: 
viz., the role of non-marital cohabitation in custody decision-making.  A 
comparison of  judicial decisions to legislative action indicates that regional 
differences still exist, but that they play out in contexts with the potential to 
diffuse rather than inflame conflicts between warring paradigms.  Considering 
the difference between legislative and judicial decision-making is critical to 
assessing the future of family law federalism. 
 
 In the context of a family system that has largely deregulated adult 
relationships, child custody decisions at divorce have become “ground zero in 
the gender wars.”244   That is, while divorces granted on no fault grounds do not 
necessarily pass judgment about the circumstances that produced the split,245 
custody decisions, which evaluate the quality of parenting, often rest, implicitly 
or explicitly, on moral views of parenting behavior.246   For family systems that 
continue to celebrate marriage, and to draw clear lines between marital and non-
marital sexuality, cohabitation with an unmarried partner should be a matter 
relevant to the child’s interests.  At the same time, in those states that deregulate 
consensual adult behavior, non-marital cohabitation, with a same-sex or 
different sex partner, should not be a matter of concern.  We would ordinarily 
expect therefore red states and blue states to differ in their approach to custody.  
They do, but not as starkly as the battles over legislative issues might suggest. 
 
 We start with a brief description of the evolution of the law in this area.  
At one time, most states considered the morality of the parents’ conduct in 
                                                          
243 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN THE U.S., supra note __, Maine’s 
legislation, which is the most limited, allows both same-sex and opposite sex couples to register 
for domestic partnership, a status which grants various rights in protective proceeding and 
intestacy; California, Connecticut, and Vermont offer couples almost all of the rights associated 
with marriage (Vermont and Connecticut’s legislation are limited to same-sex partners); New 
Jersey and Hawaii offer somewhat less expansive rights.  Id.  
244  See generally CARBONE, supra note __. 
245 States vary considerably, however, as to whether they allow fault to be considered for some 
purposes in the financial allocations at divorce.  See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a 
Modern Divorce Law,  28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996) ( summarizing and cataloguing the different 
state approaches). 
246 Id. 
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awarding custody, and viewed non-marital cohabitation, with a different sex and 
particularly a same-sex partner, to be a relevant if not automatically 
disqualifying factor.247   Today, most courts require proof of actual harm or 
detriment to the child arising from the relationship before it can be a basis for 
restricting visitation or changing custody.248  Moreover, while some courts 
continue to presume harm from a non-marital partner’s presence in the home or 
the parent’s bedroom while the child is present,249 most require a more direct 
showing of adverse effect on the child before they restrict parental contact – at 
least in the context of heterosexual relationships.250 
 
           The courts are more divided on the issue of homosexual conduct.  While 
the courts have overwhelmingly held that sexual orientation per se should not be 
a basis for denying parental contact with the child,251 many continue to 
condition custody or visitation on the absence of overnight visitors or explicit 
displays of affection or to consider it in the award of custody.252  To assess the 
regional distribution of these decisions, we go back to our list of the states with 
the lowest (Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky – all red) and 
highest (Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey 
– all blue) median age of first marriage, and describe the progression of the 
reported opinions on the issue in each state.  
 
We find, unsurprisingly, that the red and blue states approach the issue 
                                                          
247 See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N. E. 2d 421 (Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927; Dockins 
v. Dockins, 475 So. 2d 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (mother denied custody; entertained paramour 
in home when children were present).  
248 Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277 (Miss. 1992)(error for the chancellor to prohibit the presence 
of the father's lover during visitation with his children, because there was no evidence of any 
detriment to the children and harm could not be presumed from lover’s presence alone); 
Buschardt v. Jones, 998 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999), reh'g and/or transfer denied, 
(June 1, 1999) and transfer denied, (June 29, 1999)(moral misconduct insufficient to deprive a 
parent of the right to continuing contact with the child); Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So. 2d 911; 
(Miss. 1998)(error to restrict mother’s visitation to absence of male visitors without showing of 
detriment to the child); In re Marriage of Pleasant, 256 Ill. App. 3d 742, 628 N.E.2d 633, 195 
Ill. Dec. 169 (1993)(parent's open involvement in lesbian relationship not grounds to restrict 
visitation in the absence of evidence of inappropriate behavior in child's presence). 
249 See, e.g., Lasseigne v. Lasseigne, 434 So. 2d 1240 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983)(restricting 
father’s visitation on the grounds that having children exposed to his relationship with “his 
concubine” would undermine respect for the family as an institution). 
250 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note __; Robin Cheryl Miller, Restrictions on Parent's Child Visitation 
Rights Based on Parent's Sexual Conduct, 99 A.L.R.5th 475 (2002) (citing only four states -- 
Florida, Louisiana, Vermont, and Virginia -- that do so).  Virginia has recently reaffirmed this 
practice.    See Carrico v. Blevins, 402 S.E. 2d 235, 237 (Va. 1991)(upholding the restriction 
that the child could not be kept overnight where the mother and her lover lived together); 
A.O.V. v. J.R.V., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 64 (Feb. 27, 2007)(upholding restrictions on overnight 
guests and displays of affection in front of the children.) 
251 See, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. App. 1989), In In re Marriage of Birdsall, 
197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. App. 1988); Pryor v. Pryor, 714 N.E.2d 743 
(Ind. App. 1999); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760 (La. App. 1995). 
252 See, e.g., A.O.V. v. J.R.V., 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 64 (Feb. 27, 2007) (upholding restrictions 
on overnight guests and displays of affection in front of the children.) 
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differently.  The red states have been slower to move away from policing the 
morality of the litigants before them, and they remain more likely to reaffirm 
traditional moral values as part of their decisions.  The blue states, in contrast, 
have been much more eager to review lower court decisions to insure equality 
and fairness for gay and lesbian parents.   Nonetheless, both red and blue 
decisions have evolved in a much less polarized fashion than the legislative 
actions we have described in the context of same-sex marriage.  That lesser 
polarization has occurred in spite of another major difference between the red 
and blue states we describe below: three of the five red states (Arkansas, Idaho 
and Kentucky), but none of the blue states, have elected judges on the state’s 
highest court. 
 
 The leading Utah Supreme Court case on the issues is Kallas v. 
Kallas,253 decided in 1980.  The father appealed the trial court’s grant of 
overnight visitation to the mother on the ground of her lesbianism and former 
drug use;254  the Supreme Court agreed, finding that: 
 
such evidence bears clearly on the defendant’s ability to deal 
appropriately with the three minor children . . . , the most appropriate 
duration for any visits allowed, and, most importantly, the psychological 
impact on the children resulting from more extended visits with a mother 
who may, as a role model, at least to some extent cause serious conflict 
in the minds of the children concerning certain basic life-styles.255 
 
Citing cases from New York and New Jersey, the court suggested that 
overnight visits might not be appropriate or that such visits might be conditioned 
on a prohibition of non-marital cohabitation in the children’s presence.256  
  
 The Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1994.  In Tucker v. 
Tucker,257 the intermediate appellate court had reversed a trial court decision to 
transfer custody from the mother to the father, finding that the trial court failed 
to link its findings of emotional instability and moral unfitness to the mother’s 
parenting ability, and gave disproportionate weight to her lesbian relationships. 
258   The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the 
                                                          
253 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980). 
254 The trial court had excluded testimony on the subject because both factors had existed at the 
time of the divorce (although the father did not know about them at the time).   
255 Id. at 643. 
256 Id. at 645.  Two justices dissented, suggesting that the trial court was fully aware of the 
sensitive nature of the evidence, and no abuse of discretion had occurred. 
257 881 P.2d 948 (Utah app. 1994), rev’d 910 P. 2d 1209 (Utah 1996). 
258 Id. at 1214. The trial court found that: “[Lynn] has chosen to act out her sexual preference by 
conducting a relationship with a woman companion involving cohabitation without benefit of 
marriage in the same home with the minor child. The court finds that this can be analyzed and 
should be analyzed similarly to a situation involving cohabitation with a member of the opposite 
sex without benefit of marriage in the presence of a minor child.  The court finds that this 
conduct on the part of [Lynn] during the pendency of this action and prior to the custody trial in 
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trial court decision.  It observed that: 
 
The issue was not whether a trial court could properly question a parent's 
morality where that parent merely cohabited with a member of the same 
sex. Rather, the issue was whether a trial court could properly question 
the morality of a parent who had cohabited with another person before 
the divorce and while still married. The trial court found that the 
occurrence of this conduct during the marriage and in the presence of the 
child demonstrated Lynn's lack of moral example. It cannot be said that 
the trial court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.259 
 
While moving away from the visitation restrictions in Kallas designed to 
shield children from their parent’s homosexuality, the Utah Supreme Court still 
upheld the relevance of more nuanced moral determinations in a best interests 
analysis. 
  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, with its appointed justices, considered 
the issue in Fox v. Fox,260 decided about the same time as Tucker, and took a 
very different approach.   Four years later after the parties divorced, the father 
petitioned for a change of custody on the ground that the mother was a lesbian. 
The trial court granted the father’s motion.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reversed, observing that: “the evidence in this case is not of sufficient quality to 
prove the essential determinative factor -- a significant change of circumstance 
that directly and adversely affects the children.”261 
The standard the court adopted, which appears to have resolved the issue 
in Oklahoma, is consistent with the majority approach in cases of heterosexual 
cohabitation and, as developed below, most blue state rulings. 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court, with elected justices, addressed the issue in 
2004.   In McGriff v. McGriff,262  the initial divorce decree provided for joint 
physical and legal custody, with the two children spending roughly equal time 
with each parent.  After the mother discovered that the father was gay and that 
his male companion had moved into the home, she sought a modification in the 
custody decree.   The magistrate agreed, granting the mother sole physical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this matter demonstrates a lack of moral example to the child and a lack of moral fitness. This 
conduct is unlawful in the State of Utah.”  Id. at 1213. 
259 Id. at 1217-18.  The case was followed in Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603(1999).  A fifteen 
year marriage ended after the wife had an affair with her jui jitsu instructor, who was also 
married.  The trial court found that although the mother’s role as primary caretaker would have 
ordinarily justified an award of custody to her, recent gun and domestic violence charges against 
her lover and her continuing involvement with him justified the award to the father.  The court 
of appeal emphasized that this is not a case based solely on the fact of the non-marital affair or 
the character of the parties, but a combination of factors related to the children’s best interests.  
Id. at 608. 
260 904 P.2d 66 (1995). 
261 Id. at 70. 
262  99 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2004). 
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custody and providing the father visitation on the condition he not reside with 
his male partner during their visits.  The magistrate found, inter alia, that: 
 
Father's decision to openly co-habit with [his partner]  . . . is a change that will 
generate questions from the girls and their friends regarding their Father's 
lifestyle. Moreover, Father has minimized this issue in regard to the 
conservative culture and morays (sic) in which the children live. Father has 
shown some insensitivity to the girls' needs regarding his lifestyle, . . . expressly 
contrary to the requests of and excluding the children's Mother.263 
 
 The father appealed, maintaining that the mother had difficulty accepting 
his sexual orientation, and that her motion to change custody was entirely based 
on his sexual orientation without a showing of detriment to the children. The 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court order.  While it emphasized that a 
change of custody could not be based on sexual orientation per se,264 it found 
that magistrate had made specific findings on the effect on the children arising 
from the growing hostility between the parents, the father’s partner’s actions 
toward the Mother, and the Father’s refusal to respect the mother’s wishes for 
joint communication with the children about the father’s homosexuality.265 
 
 The Arkansas Supreme Court, again with elected justices, walked a 
different tightrope in Taylor v. Taylor, 266 decided during the same time period 
as the Idaho case. In Taylor, the mother shared her home with an “admitted 
lesbian,” who paid rent and sometimes slept in the mother’s bed.267  The 
children occasionally joined them.268  The mother testified, however, that she 
believed that homosexuality was wrong, and that she did not have a sexual 
relationship with the woman.269  The trial court granted the father’s motion to 
modify custody, observing that the mother’s decision simply to let a lesbian live 
in her house with the children “even without sex is inappropriate behavior  . . . . 
It is at least poor parental judgment on the part of defendant to allow a well 
known lesbian to both reside with defendant and the children and sleep in the 
same bed with defendant.”270 
 
 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.  Although it acknowledged that 
“this court has held that a parent's unmarried cohabitation with a romantic 
                                                          
263 Id. at 117. 
264 Id. 
265 The court observed that: “She simply alleges that his living openly as a homosexual needed 
to be appropriately explained to the children through the help of professional counseling and a 
cooperative effort by both parents--not an unreasonable request.”  Id. at 118.  The father, 
however, who became visibly angry in the Mother’s presence, maintained that she had difficulty 
accepting his sexual orientation and had refused to work with him.  Id. 
266  110 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2003). 
267 Id. at  732. 
268 Id.  
269 Id. at 732-33. 
270 Id. at  734.  The court cited the Taylor decision.  
                             RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 
 
50
partner, or a parent's promiscuous conduct or lifestyle, in the presence of a child 
cannot be abided,”271 it emphasized “the absence of proof that a homosexual 
relationship was occurring” and the evidence showing that the children were 
well adjusted and happy and “had not been adversely affected” by their mother’s 
living arrangement.272   
 
 The distinction between homosexuality per se and non-marital 
cohabitation in the child’s presence remains good law in Arkansas.  In a recent 
case affirming a change of custody from mother to father, the intermediate court 
of appeal  claimed that its decision did not depend on the mother’s sexual 
orientation, but  the fact that she “had six different sexual partners in a four-and-
a-half year period. In every instance, appellant cohabited with her partner in the 
presence of Zachary despite an explicit court order that forbade extramarital 
cohabitation in front of the child.273 
 
 The Arkansas Supreme Court has applied the same test to heterosexual 
couples, upholding a transfer of custody in 2005 based on the mother’s non-
marital cohabitation, remarking that it indicated instability in the child’s life.274  
Arkansas courts continue to affirm the important of moral values to custody 
decisions. 
 
 In contrast to the other states, Kentucky has almost no reported opinions 
                                                          
271 Id. at 737. 
272 Id. at 739. 
273 Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 251 (Apr. 11, 2007).  The initial order 
prohibiting cohabitation occurred in response to the father’s first motion to modify custody, 
when the mother was living with a man to whom she was engaged.  The trial court, explaining 
the change of custody, emphasized the mother’s purposeful lack of compliance with the court 
order, and the fact that the non-cohabitation order was designed to provide stability in the 
child’s life.  The trial court found that the mother’s frequent change of partners showed a “lack 
of residential, employment, financial and moral stability manifest[ing] an overall lack of stability 
in Zachary's life warranting a change of custody.” 
274 See Alphin v. Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160 (Ark. 2005).  The trial court relied explicitly on the 
Mother’s “illicit sexual relationship” in changing custody, and viewed her marriage to the 
boyfriend “as a ruse” because the partners testified that they moved up the date to look better in 
front of the court.  Id. at 165.  The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court order, observed 
that: “It is true that this court and the court of appeals have held that extramarital cohabitation in 
the presence of children ‘has never been condoned in Arkansas, is contrary to the public policy 
of promoting a stable environment for children, and may of itself constitute a material change of 
circumstances warranting a change of custody.’” (Citations omitted).  Id.   The court then noted, 
however, that other cases in which the courts transferred custody involved violation of a non-
cohabitation order.  It nonetheless upheld the transfer of custody in this case on the basis of the 
court’s specific findings that the mother’s frequent changes of residence (and romantic partners) 
involved instability not in the best interests of the child.  Id. at 166.  Justice Betty C. Dickey 
dissented, accusing the trial court of applying a “blatant double standard” as it criticized the 
mother’s “illicit sexual relationship” before her remarriage, but not the father’s relationship with 
his new wife, who was three months pregnant with his child at the time they married.  Id. at 167. 
167 (Dickey, J., dissenting).  The dissent also noted that the mother’s residential instability was 
caused in part by the father’s failure to contribute to their daughter’s care.  Id. at 167-68. 
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on point.  The last reported decision occurred in 1980, when the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals, citing expert testimony, held that: 
 
Without question, in my opinion, there is social stigma attached to 
homosexuality. Therefore Shannon will have additional burdens to bear 
in terms of teasing, possible embarrassment and internal conflicts. Also, 
there is excellent scientific research on the effects of parental modeling 
on children. Speculating from such data, it is reasonable to suggest that 
Shannon may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual 
identity of her own in the future. There would seem to me to be no 
rational reason for purposely submitting a child to these additional and 
potentially debilitating influences.275  
 
 The Kentucky courts refused to apply a similar standard to a case of 
heterosexual cohabitation in 1989, holding that mere misconduct without a 
showing that the misconduct has affected or is likely to have an adverse effect 
on the child is an insufficient basis for a modification of custody.276   The only 
recent case to address same-sex cohabitation is one refusing to recognize a 
lesbian partner as a de facto parent under Kentucky law.277  While Kentucky 
custody decisions may not be hostile to sexual activity outside of marriage, they 
do appear hostile to such activity when it occurs between gay and lesbian 
partners.    
 
 The five states with the highest median ages of marriage, Massachusetts, 
New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey, are also among the most 
liberal in the country when it comes to numerous issues, including a parent’s  
sexual choices.  Massachusetts, most obviously,  has mandated recognition of 
same-sex marriage as a matter of basic equality.   The New Jersey courts have 
required recognition of a status comparable to marriage, and Connecticut has 
adopted domestic partnership legislation.278  Nonetheless, the issue is not  
whether these states take different positions on non-marital or same-sex 
cohabitation from those in red states, but when they did so. 
 
 Massachusetts has ruled from the early eighties that “a parent’s life-
style, standing alone, is insufficient ground for severing the natural bond 
between a parent and a child.”279  In a 1980, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed a dependency case that turned on the trial judge's finding that 
"[t]he environment in which [the mother] proposes to raise the children, namely, 
a Lesbian household, creates an element of instability that would adversely 
                                                          
275 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App  1980). 
276 Sosh v. Sosh, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 72 (Ct. App.)(mother’s extramarital affair with 
overnight guest. 
277 B. F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006) 
278  See supra note __.  
279 Doe v. Doe,  452 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1983). 
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affect the welfare of the children."280   The appellate courts extended the ruling 
in 1983 to a divorce proceeding, holding that the mother’s relationship with a 
lesbian cohabitant was not grounds to grant sole custody to the father.281  Nor 
did the court suggest restrictions on overnight visitors would be appropriate. 
 
 The New York cases of Di Stefano v. Di Stefano282 and In re Jane B.,283 
decided in the seventies, have been cited by other jurisdictions as precedent for 
restricting the custodial rights of gay or lesbian parents.284  Both cases granted 
custody to the fathers over lesbian mothers, finding that same-sex cohabitation 
“creates an improper environment” for children.285  
  
 Despite the early New York cases, the appellate division in 1986 upheld 
a transfer of custody from the mother to a gay father living with a male partner 
in one of the first reported cases in the country to do so.286    Thus,  the court 
distanced itself from the New York decisions of the seventies, adopting a nexus 
test that made sexual orientation irrelevant absent a showing that the children 
are emotionally affected.287  It also cited with approval another New York case, 
striking restrictions on the father’s male partner as pointless and punitive.288  
 
 Rhode Island, like Kentucky, has relatively few cases on point.  In 1989, 
the state Supreme Court upheld conditions that prohibited a custodial mother 
from having overnight male visitors even without a showing of negative impact 
on the child.289  By 2000, however, the Supreme Court had no trouble upholding 
a trial court’s finding that a request for such an order was frivolous.290  Rhode 
Island has also recognized lesbian partners as de facto parents under state law.291  
 
  In Connecticut in 1980, the state supreme court upheld a restriction on 
                                                          
280  Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E. 2d 1207, 1211 (Mass. 1980). 
281 Doe v. Doe,  452 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1983). 
282  401 N.Y.S.2d 636(4th Dep't 1978) . In Di Stefano, the appellate court upheld a grant of 
custody of the couple’s three children to the father, and conditioned the wife’s visitation on the 
absence of her lesbian partner, finding that the lower court's decision “reasonably may be read to 
conclude that the wife's conduct in failing to keep her lesbian relationship with . . . [her partner] 
separate from her role as a mother has had, and predictably will have, a detrimental effect upon 
the children.” Id. at 638. 
283 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
284 See, e.g., Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980). 
285  380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1976) 
286 M.A.B., v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
287 Id. at 927. 
288 See Gottlieb v Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1985).  In this case, the court excised portions of 
the judgment that conditioned the father's visitation privileges upon the total exclusion of his 
lover or any other homosexuals during visitation. The court said: "[The] daughter must be fully 
conversant with the fact that her father has a live-in male lover, and that excluding the lover as a 
condition of visitation serves no real purpose other than as a punitive measure against the 
father.”  Id. at 182 (Kupferman, J.P., concurring). 
289 Parrillo v. Parrillo, 554 A.2d 1043  (R. I. 1989). 
290 Logan v. Logan, 763 A.2d 587, 589 (R.I. 2000). 
291 Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).  
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the father’s visitation that excluded overnight visitation "where the defendant is 
living with another woman without the benefit of wedlock." 292    By 2000, 
however, Connecticut courts were rejecting a mother’s request to limit father’s 
visitation in light of his non-marital visitation because there was no evidence it 
adversely affected children or that children, who were Catholic, expressed 
religious concerns about it.293  In addition, the Superior Court had no difficulty 
changing a joint custody order to sole custody for a lesbian mother living with 
her partner in light of the father’s mental health issues, commenting only that 
both parents had “non-traditional households.”294  The state also recognizes the 
standing of same-sex partners to seek visitation.295 
 
 Finally, New Jersey has had the most complete transformation.  In the 
early seventies, state courts restricted the visitation rights of a father who took 
his three children to gay marches and rallies.  The court required in one case that 
during visitation, the father could not: 
  
1) not cohabit or sleep with any individual other than a lawful spouse,  
2) not take the children or allow them to be taken to "The Firehouse," 
and  
3) not involve the children in any homosexual related activities or 
publicity. 
4) not be in the presence of his lover.296 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its 2006 decision requiring the state to 
extend recognition to same sex couples on the same terms as marriage, referred 
explicitly to this case as an example of discrimination.297  Nonetheless, as early 
as 1979, the state appellate courts reversed a trial court order that transferred 
custody from the mother to the father as a result of the mother’s 
homosexuality.298 
 
 The red states in this group certainly differ from the blue states.  Of the 
five red states with the lowest median age of marriage, only one (Oklahoma) 
expressly reversed a trial court’s consideration of a parent’s same-sex 
cohabitation because it did not make specific findings of adverse effect.  Three 
states (Utah, Idaho and Arkansas) have upheld the relevance of such 
                                                          
292 Gallo v. Gallo,  440 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1981). It nonetheless limited the restriction to the 
woman about whom the trial court had made specific findings with respect to the impact on the 
child rather than to all women. 
293 Duffany v. Duffany,  2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2821. 
294 Zienka v. Zienka, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1638. 
295 Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840, 844 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding 
that lesbian co-parent had standing to petition for visitation). 
296 In re J. S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 97 (N.J. Sup. 1974). 
297  Lewis v Harris,  908 A.2d 196.   
298 M.P., v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. 1979)(holding that children's best interests were to remain 
with defendant and that they could best learn how to cope with her homosexuality by 
confronting its existence rather than being sheltered.)  
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considerations, with Arkansas and Idaho doing so in relatively recent decisions 
and Utah doing so in 1994.   In contrast, in the five blue states with the highest 
median age of marriage, the most recent decision we could find addressing non-
marital sexuality in the context of custody or visitation was the 1989 Rhode 
Island decision affirming restrictions over overnight heterosexual cohabitation.   
Massachusetts and New Jersey were reversing trial court decisions based on 
sexual orientation by 1980, and New York expressly affirmed the transfer of 
custody from a fit mother to a gay father in the mid-eighties.  None of the five 
states have current reported decisions within the last decade restricting custody 
or visitation on the basis of the parent’s sexual activity. 
 
 Aside from the results, the tone of the cases differs as well.  The state 
supreme courts in Utah, Idaho and Arkansas have expressly affirmed the lower 
courts’ consideration of parent’s morality, while the blue state courts, especially 
in Massachusetts and New Jersey, were more likely to use the language of 
equality,299 and even when using similar language, more likely to overturn lower 
court decisions that took sexual orientation into account.300   
 
 Nonetheless, the reported judicial decisions show significantly less 
polarization than the legislation on abortion and same-sex marriage.  All of the 
reported decisions reject sexual orientation as a per se factor precluding custody 
or visitation, and all require findings of fact that tie sexuality to an impact on the 
children, though they differ in the rigor of the showing necessary to do so.301  
Moreover, the states generally appear to be moving in the direction of less rather 
than more regulation of sexuality even if they are not all doing so at the same 
time.302  The most telling facts may be not so much the cases on the record, but 
the relative silence from states such as Utah unlikely to rule out such 
considerations altogether.   
                                                          
299 See especially New Jersey and Massachusetts decisions on marriage supra.   
300 Trial courts in a number of states found that parents with unmarried partners created more 
unstable environments for their children. Compare, e.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 251 (April 11, 2007)(upholding decision transferring custody to father after 
consideration of wife’s “unstable” relationships with different partners) with  Bezio v. 
Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579 (1980) (overturning trial court decision based on such grounds). 
301 See, e.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 251 (Apr. 11, 2007)(construing the trial 
court finding as not having anything to do with sexual orientation at all, only with the mother’s 
instability in having many different partners and her defiance of a trial court order forbidding 
cohabitation).  Cf. In re Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1996)(parental conduct 
may be restricted only if child's physical, mental, or emotional health would be endangered). 
302 See, e.g., the rulings from other red states only slightly below the five red states with the 
lowest median ages of marriage: Fulk v. Fulk, 827 So. 2d 736 (2002 Miss. App.)(court should 
not have restricted lesbian mother’s parent's visitation rights unless the visitation seriously 
endangered the child.); Moses v. King,  637 S.E.2d 97 (2006 Ga. App.), cert. denied, King v. 
Moses, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 84 (Jan. 8, 2007)(overturning trial court ruling that placed too much 
emphasis on mother’s affair with another woman, and inappropriately restricted her visitation 
rights).  Georgia and Mississippi have systems for the nonpartisan election of judges. AMERICAN 
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL 
JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf.   
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D.  Conclusion: Family Law Federalism: Is Polarization Avoidable? 
 
 If two different family systems exist, then conflict may appear 
inevitable.  We believe, however, that  the tensions between the two systems can 
be managed.  That is, the greatest clashes occur in the context of high profiles 
cases (e.g., Roe v. Wade and its progeny) that become wedge issues serving the 
interests of political parties that hope to profit at the ballot box.  The alternative 
is a system of dispute resolution that creates more space for the evolution of 
family mores over time. 
 
 Nonetheless, the question of whether elected state courts can effectively 
police the fairness of trial court results in the context of contested values 
remains in doubt.   A series of Alabama decisions demonstrate that the culture 
wars we have chronicled exist within states as much as they do between red 
states and blue, and the injection of polarized rather than consensus values into 
the debate undermines the role of courts in mediating public morality even in the 
most conservative of states.  
 
 Let us turn to Alabama.  The Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court Roy Moore is renowned for his insistence on displaying  the ten 
commandments in the Alabama courthouse, and Alabama eventually removed 
him from office because of his defiance of the federal order requiring that he 
desist. 303  Less well known is his injection of religious authority into family law 
decision-making.  His efforts came to a head in Ex parte H.H.304  In that case, 
the mother, who was living with a lesbian partner in California, sought to 
modify an order granting the father custody, on the grounds that the father was 
physically abusive toward the children, whipping them with a belt, and slapping 
at least one of the children hard enough to cause a nosebleed.305  The father 
disputed the characterization and severity of the events.  The trial court ruled in 
his favor, but the court of appeals reversed finding that the mother had 
substantiated her claim of physical abuse.306  The Alabama Supreme Court 
reversed again, reinstating the trial court judgment.   It held in a brief opinion 
that the appellate court should have deferred to the trial court judge, who had 
evaluated “the credibility of the testimony and who observed the demeanor of 
the witnesses, [and] found that, although the father's disciplinary actions may 
occasionally be excessive, no abuse had occurred. 307 
                                                          
303 See Alabama Ousts Justice Moore, WorldNetDaily, November 13, 2003 (reporting that Chief 
Justice Roy Moore had been removed from the court halfway through his elected term for 
“defiance of a federal judge's order to move his Ten Commandments monument from the 
rotunda of the state courthouse.”) 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35566. 
304 830 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002). 
305 Id. at 23. 
306 Id. at 24-25. 
307  Id. at 25. 




 Justice Moore wrote a separate opinion to emphasize that “the 
homosexual conduct of a parent—conduct involving a sexual relationship 
between two persons of the same gender—creates a strong presumption of 
unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of 
his or her own children.”308  He acknowledged that the mother had entered into a 
domestic partnership in California, but found this utterly irrelevant, given that 
Alabama provides no legal recognition to same-sex relationships.  Moreover, he 
insisted, in extremely strong and direct language, that: 
 
Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, Immoral, 
detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of 
nature's God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated. Such conduct 
violates both the criminal and civil laws of this State and is destructive to a basic 
building block of society -- the family. The law of Alabama is not only clear in 
its condemning such conduct, but the courts of this State have consistently held 
that exposing a child to such behavior has a destructive and seriously 
detrimental effect on the children. It is an inherent evil against which children 
must be protected.309 
 
  The contrast between the majority opinion and the concurrence is 
striking.  In earlier cases, the Alabama Supreme Court had held that a trial court 
could restrict custody and visitation to avoid children’s exposure to non-marital 
cohabitation even without a showing of detriment to the child.310   In this case, 
the court did not mention these prior rulings, which would have provided an 
alternative basis for the result.  Instead, the court used technical grounds for the 
reversal, finding that the intermediate court had not given sufficient deference to 
the trial court’s findings of fact..  Justice Moore, in one of the single most 
intemperate opinions in the country, used the occasion not only to reaffirm the 
earlier rulings, but to condemn homosexuality with references to “Sodom and 
Gomorrah.”311 
 
 The Alabama Supreme Court, increasingly wary of the issue, 
demonstrated similar deference to the trial court in a heterosexual cohabitation 
                                                          
308 Id. at 26. 
309 Id.  
310  See Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998), holding that where the father had 
remarried and the mother had changed from involvement in a discreet affair to open cohabitation 
with her lesbian partner, the trial court could transfer custody to father on the basis of a best 
interests finding without a showing of detriment to the child.  See also Ex parte D. W. W (R. W. 
v. D. W. W.), 717 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1998), holding that even without evidence of adverse effect, 
the trial judge would have been justified in restricting the mother's visitation in order to limit her 
children's exposure to her "lesbian lifestyle." The court noted that exposing children to a 
"lifestyle . . . that is illegal under the laws of this state[,] and immoral in the eyes of most of its 
citizens, could greatly traumatize them." 717 So. 2d at 796. 
311 Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26, 31 (Moore, J., concurring). 
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case decided the same year.312  The parties had divorced as a result of the 
mother’s adultery, and the mother had moved in with her boyfriend while the 
father was stationed with the Army in Korea.313   By the time of the appellate 
decision, she had also given birth to a child with the boyfriend.314  The court of 
appeals nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant the father’s motion 
to modify custody, and the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari.315   
Justice Moore filed an impassioned dissent, writing that, “[f]or years there has 
been a steady deterioration of this Court's standard regarding the fitness of an 
adulterous parent in a custody case. Prior decisions of this Court establish a 
conclusive presumption that a parent who has committed adultery is unfit to 
have custody of a minor child.”316 
  
 Justice Moore, elected to his position on the Alabama Supreme Court,317 
wished to make the reaffirmation of Christian standards of morality central to 
family law decision-making.  The other justices responded by shifting to more 
technical and procedural grounds for their decisions – and have declined to take 
another non-marital cohabitation (heterosexual or homosexual) case in the five 
years since Justice Moore’s opinions.318  In the interim, the Alabama appellate 
courts have neither actively policed the fairness of trial court decisions 319  nor 
                                                          
312 848 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 2002) 
313 Pankey v. Pankey, 848 So.2d  958, 961 (Ala. Ct. App. 2002).  
314 Id. at 962. 
315 Id. at 963. 
316 Id. at 968. 
317 We thank political scientist Jane Curry for the observation that whether or not justices are 
elected might affect decision-making in this area.  Oklahoma, which has gone the farthest 
towards a blue state approach of our five red states on non-marital cohabitation, has an 
appointed judiciary.  Arkansas, which has taken the largest number of cases involving non-
marital cohabitation, has an elected judiciary, as do Alabama, Idaho, and Kentucky. See Institute 
for Legal Reform, Justice System, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/justicesystem.cfm?state=ID.  Utah justices are 
appointed.  AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE 
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf.   
In the five blue states – Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Rhode Island -- 
all of the justices of the states’ highest court are appointed.  Id. 
318 Lower Alabama courts have dealt with issues of nonmarital cohabitation during this time 
period.  In  Pankey v. Pankey, 848 So. 2d 958, 961  (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), the court referred  to 
the mother’s adultery, the existence of the child she bore with the boyfriend, and the boyfriend’s 
financial support, but, nonetheless, did not change custody to the father. Id. at 961-62.   In the 
one appellate decision to raise the issue of homosexual conduct during this time period, the 
court went out of its way to emphasize that the trial court had not based its decision transferring 
custody to the father solely on the mother’s cohabitation with a lesbian partner, but rather on an 
unweighted variety of factors, including allegations of neglect and interference with the father’s 
visitation, affecting the child’s best interests.  L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2004). The court underscored the father's testimony that he would have had the same concerns 
for the child's well being if the mother’s partner “was a man” and that the “visitation disputes, 
neglect, and a concern for the child's safety, as well as the mother's relationship with P.M., gave 
him reason to file the modification petition.”  Id. at 947 
319 The courts have been more willing to do so in the cases of heterosexual cohabitation. In 
another cases decided in 2002, the intermediate appellate court reversed a trial court decision 
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claimed a role as arbiters of family morality with the same confidence as the 
courts in earlier eras. 320     
 
V.   CREATING SPACE FOR FAMILY LAW FEDERALISM 
 
Partisanship is an increasingly salient fact of American political life.  
Political activists have used “wedge” issues to energize their core supporters, 
and divide an electorate that most polls show has overwhelmingly moderate and 
stable political views.321   Few issues have been more successful in this respect 
than moral values.  While public attitudes on the economic, racial and other 
issues that once defined party positions have remain largely unchanged over the 
last forty years, public attitudes toward abortion and sexuality have shifted – and 
become much more polarized. 322   We argue in this article that family issues are 
not only particularly vulnerable to partisan tactics, but also that they are  central 
to the success of partisan tactics because the divisions over family values rest on 
genuine and deep-seated cultural anxieties. . 
 
Age is the defining element in the tensions between the two systems.  
The blue state system, which we have termed the “new middle class morality,” 
posits a substantial separation from the beginning of adulthood and the 
assumption of family responsibilities.323   This separation necessarily involves 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that had transferred custody to the father solely on the basis of the mother’s cohabitation in the 
presence of the child with men to whom she was not married.  The appellate court reversed 
holding that for “heterosexual misconduct” to be a basis for a change of custody, there must be a 
showing of detriment to the child.  Riley v. Riley, 882 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).  
Although the opinion was issued in November, 2002, it was not released for publication until 
mid-2004.   See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 883 So. 2d 1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(reversing trial 
court modification of custody order on the basis of the mother’s non-marital cohabitation, 
finding that it was insufficient as sole basis for modification of custody in case in which mother 
married boyfriend, and father also had intimate partner overnight in the house in the presence of 
the children). 
320 For example, in 1998, the Alabama Supreme Court baldly stated:   “[e]ven without this 
evidence that the children have been adversely affected by their mother's relationship, the trial 
court would have been justified in restricting R.W.'s visitation, in order to limit the children's 
exposure to their mother's lesbian lifestyle . . . Restrictions such as those at issue here are 
common tools used to shield a child from the harmful effects of a parent's illicit sexual 
relationships -- heterosexual or homosexual.” Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 
1998). 
321 John W. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 71 (2003); FIORINA, supra note __.  
322 Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, Partisans without constraint: Political polarization 
and trends in American public opinion, (June 13, 2007), 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding 
polarization on moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on 
moral issues among the better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral 
issues increasing much more dramatically since the mid-eighties).   
323 As discussed supra, sociologist Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has termed this new “pathways to 
adulthood.”   She observes that “preparation for adult life is more prolonged than it has been in 
the past. This is largely due to two related factors: a longer period of schooling before entry into 
the work world and the postponement of marriage until older ages.”  Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, 
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training for autonomy.324  Young adults now have more time in which they must 
manage dramatically more choices about sexuality,325 the nature of workforce 
participation, and the construction of gender roles.326 When in their mid-to-late 
twenties (or early thirties for the more educated) they form families, they do so 
as mature adults, already socialized into adult roles.  The linchpin in this process 
is avoiding improvident childbirth, and that too is a matter of managing choice: 
birth control, abortion, and the possibility of single parenthood are critical 
options in the new era.327  
 
New life patterns present a direct affront to more traditional, 
conservative, and religious moral understandings and to the laws that have 
supported them.  They conflict with the systems that have historically 
shepherded young adults from parent-supervised adolescence into formally 
prescribed adult roles.   Yet, marriage at younger ages is a risky enterprise.  It 
has historically required a high degree of community-reinforced socialization 
into marital roles – including stereotypical gender roles, male financial 
contributions and female dependence – to succeed. 328  New research emphasizes 
that full emotional maturity does not occur until the mid-twenties, and the less 
than fully mature early twenties brain (especially if male) is primed for risk-
taking and sexual experimentation.329  At the same time, the modern economy 
provides fewer opportunities for the men who are ready to start families in their 
early twenties to move into productive employment.330  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality, 
http://www.nplc.org/commonground/papers/whiteheadpaper.htm 
324 Id.   
325 Whitehead emphasizes that one of the most dramatic elements in this shift is the interval 
between age of first intercourse (17 for women, 16 for men) and marriage (25 for women and 26 
for men).  For African-Americans, the average interval is 12 years for women and 19 years for 
men.   Id. 
326 MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999), 
AND FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993)(describing the challenge of intimacy in 
a post-modern world where roles, rather than constitutive of self, become partial, changing and 
subject to an almost infinite array of choices and combinations).   
327 We note that while we have described the process of cultural change largely in geographic terms, 
the rate at which different groups have moved toward the blue state model also differs by class and 
race.   The most highly educated sector of the population throughout the country is more likely to 
defer the beginning of sexual activity, more likely to use contraception to manage non-marital 
sexuality and less likely to experience non-marital childbirth.  See McLanahan, supra.   Moreover, 
there is considerable disagreement on the benefits of postponing childbearing for the most 
disadvantaged portions of the population.  Studies show, for example, that African-Americans 
experience greater fertility problems than whites, and depend more on older relatives such as 
grandparents who may be less able to assist as time passes.  See, e.g., AT Geronimus, The weathering 
hypothesis and the health of African-American women and infants: evidence and speculations. 2 Ethn 
Dis 207 (1992) (documenting faster decline in fertility for African-Americans.) 
328 For a discussion of the relationship between marriage and socialization into gender roles, see 
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 92-94 (1993). 
329 See supra note __. 
 330 Liana C. Sayer, Nathan Wright and Kathryn Edin, Class Differences in Family Attitudes 3 
(2005)(summarizing literature on class, employment prospects, and family patterns)(manuscript on 
file with authors)(review and resubmit, Journal of Marriage and the Family). 




These changes pose challenges for the country (and, indeed, the world) 
as a whole.  They exacerbate class and racial inequalities.   In Europe and Japan, 
they are associated with an increasingly intense debate about fertility rates that 
have plunged well below the replacement level.331  In the United States, 
however, they contribute to polarization over the issue of morality because they 
lead to very different political and legal prescriptions.   The “blue states” (and 
the more liberal, more secular elite everywhere) have largely accepted the 
changes.  They support their daughters’ education about sexuality and birth 
control.  They want abortion to be available.  They address sexuality activity 
through a lens of tolerance and equality.  They recognize that women’s financial 
and men’s domestic contributions are vital to family success.  They negotiate 
rather than mandate family formation and the assumption of adult roles.  And to 
the extent they share concern about family instability and unbridled sexuality, 
they believe that the solutions lie in private reinforcement of acceptable 
standards of conduct rather than in public condemnations. 
 
For the red states (and particularly for the more conservative, more 
traditional and religious among them), these changes have produced a high 
degree of cognitive dissonance.  The cornerstone of the change – the increasing 
delay between the beginning of adulthood and marriage – is impossible to 
manage within the established values framework.   Relaxing attitudes towards 
non-marital sexuality requires letting go of religiously mandated teachings.   
Yet, expecting abstinence until the mid-twenties is unrealistic.  Social science 
research does suggest that religious women start sexuality activity later, but 
more than half of even weekly church-goers were no longer virgins by the age 
of 18;332 it further suggests that well over 90% of all adults engage in sex before 
they marry, and that even those who delay sexual activity into their twenties are 
likely to do so.333  Moreover, marriage at an early age – particularly one 
compelled by an improvident pregnancy – is unlikely to last, and the children 
produced by dysfunctional unions a greater drain on public and grandparent 
resources.  To the extent that abstinence and early marriage have worked 
historically, they have required a high degree of public consensus and 
reinforcement of appropriate behavior.  Nationally, that consensus is gone.334  
 
The divergence in these family systems and worldviews poses a difficult 
challenge for law.  If each system proceeded on its own terms, within political 
                                                          
331 Indeed, a new European paper suggests that the difference between the higher fertility 
northern European states and the lower fertility Southern European states is age of family 
formation.  Young adults in higher fertility nations begin childbearing (and leave home) at 
earlier ages; they are also more likely to have children outside of marriage.  See Bignami-Van 
Assche and Billari, supra note __.   
332 MARK D. REGNERUS, FORBIDDEN FRUIT:  SEX & RELIGION IN THE LIVES OF AMERICAN 
TEENAGERS  121 (2007). 
333 Id.  
334 See discussion supra note __. 
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and legal units that shared a common cultural framework, we would predict 
continued evolution, but not necessarily irreconcilable conflicts.  Differences 
about family morality are not unprecedented and have undergone similar 
processes of evolution in the past.  Moreover, the two systems share common 
values and objectives.  The secular middle class is rediscovering the importance 
of commitment, with falling divorce rates and more self-conscious consideration 
of the importance of stability for children.335  Falling teen birth rates involve 
greater abstinence as well as more effective contraception, particularly for the 
better off.336   The length of time between the beginning of sexuality and 
marriage is increasing in red states as well as blue, and doing so without much 
evidence of abstinence extending into early adulthood.  And all states are to 
some degree purple, with differences within them that play out on race, class, 
gender, religious and urban/rural lines.   
 
 Nonetheless, the intrusion of polarized political discourse into core 
issues of family law poses a particular difficult challenge for the judiciary.  The 
courts, in their day-to-day decision-making on intimate family matters  often act 
as midwives guiding the birth of new values.  The change in custody decision-
making from a maternal preference to an ideal of shared custody presents a case 
in point.  Faced with increasing divorce rates and the changing role of women, 
the judiciary, with or without legislation in the background, articulated on a 
case-by-case basis over a period of decades new willingness to consider shared 
custody arrangements, and the development of principles that made shared 
responsibility for children the new starting point for custody decision-making.  
Despite the opposition of both feminists and traditionalists, the new ethic has 
taken hold not just in terms of legal doctrine, but as a consensus norm for post-
divorce ordering.337  
 
 Effective judicial leadership, however, requires a consensus-building, 
non-partisan stance.   Such leadership may not be possible on abortion,338 just as 
the courts foundered historically on no-fault divorce.  Significant portions of the 
judiciary and the public had been willing to  consider mutual consent divorce 
without a showing of fault since the 1920’s.  Religious opposition, however, 
blocked no-fault legislation for decades.  In the interim, courts circumvented the 
legislative stalemate through expansion of the category of “extreme cruelty” or 
manufactured cases of adultery.339  The hypocrisy involved in implementing 
legislation that no longer reflected the views of the judges or the litigants before 
them, however, threatened the legitimacy of the judicial process.  The disrepute 
that infected the process may have ultimately made as powerful a case for 
                                                          
335 McLanahan, supra note __. 
336 CHILD TRENDS, CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED 
WOMEN, http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/75UnmarriedBirths.cfm. 
337 For an account of this transformation, see CARBONE, supra note __, Chapter 13 
338 See Post and Siegel, supra note __. 
339 Id.     
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divorce reform as the substance of the no-fault principle itself.340   
 
The divergence in family systems in a time of partisanship poses similar 
challenges as the courts navigate the political and cultural minefields underlying 
moral issues.  Condemnation of non-marital sexuality might have moral salience 
when made on a consensus basis; it has little as a partisan stance.  Nonetheless, 
excusing non-martial cohabitation, particularly between same-sex couples, may 
be a matter of course in Rhode Island and politically perilous in Arkansas.  The 
experience of the Alabama appellate courts, which have skirted condemnation of 
non-marital cohabitation once Justice Moore associated it with assertion of 
Biblical references as legal authority, provides a cautionary case in point.   So, 
too, does the experience of the New Hampshire legislature in first embracing, 
then rejecting parental notification laws with a change in the political 
composition of the legislature.  Parental notification, even if misguided, once 
commanded overwhelming political support.  Nuanced implementation might 
have diffused the symbolic affront to traditional values while softening or 
circumventing the difficulties of implementation.341  Using it to wage culture 
war through the initiative process threatens to discredit the enterprise, and to 
undermine the credibility of the judiciary who must implement the resulting 
laws.342  
 
At the same time, however, values assertion, when done as a genuine 
expression of either consensus leadership or majority values, does have a place 
in the  judicial process.  Recognition that there may be two (or more) internally 
coherent and conflicting family systems raises challenges for a federal system 
whether or not they are caught up in partisan challenges.  Yet, these challenges 
should be the ordinary ones of federalism, rather than polarized disputes that 
threaten to derail judicial decision-making.  Federalism, after all, is designed to 
recognize and diffuse regional differences.  We note, in particular, the following 
tools at its disposal:     
 
First, given the deep divisions we have documented, the expression of 
values may be best undertaken within smaller political units with greater 
sensitivity to regional variation.  Family law, in particular, is state law, and 
                                                          
340 Id. 
341 In Maine, for example,  a doctor’s statement provides the basis for objection.  ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597-A(2)(A)(West 2007).  The doctor’s statement, as opposed to use of 
the judicial process, keeps the issue private.   Moreover, as Professor Sanger’s article 
demonstrates, doctors are involved in counseling the patients on whom they would perform 
abortions in any event; judges are unsuited to the role, and the formal judicial process serves 
primarily to humiliate teens caught up in the process, who, if they have good reasons not to 
inform their parents, are likely to be already victims of dysfunctional families and often coercive 
or abusive sexual relations.  Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion, supra note __. 
342 The overwhelming experience of judges conducting judicial bypass proceedings is to refuse 
to hear the cases, to reject all petitions on the basis of anti-abortion beliefs, or to rubber stamp 
them on the grounds that the courts have little basis on which to second guess the assertions.  
See id. 
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articulation of normative aspirations can be undertaken at that level.  While 
incorporating fire and brimstone in judicial decisions may not be appropriate 
anywhere, sensitivity to religious values and appropriate cultural expression of 
these values will necessarily differ with geography and time.343 
 
 Second, the courts should continue to police the distinction between the 
expression of shared values, and the imposition of state control on those who 
dissent.  Lawrence v. Texas,344 which held criminal prosecution of same-sex 
sodomy unconstitutional, struck exactly the right balance in this regard.  It 
provided safeguards from state intrusion in the bedroom, recognizing the value 
of same-sex intimacy without a direct challenge to the expression of contrary 
values.  The majority opinion emphasized that: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State."345 
 
 Third, the courts should pay particular attention to the avenues of family 
evolution.  The Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. 
Wade were important milestones in protecting autonomy in individual decisions 
about the constitution of family.  While we believe there is room for legislating 
balancing in the terms of access to such services, the courts should continue to 
guard against wholesale prohibitions.346  Access to contraception could easily 
become as much of a battleground as access to abortion.347 
 
 Fourth, courts often diffuse hot button issues by selecting less 
controversial frames as a basis for resolution.  A critical part of respect for 
differing family systems, for example, involves interstate travel and recognition, 
and the right to travel is likely to become an increasingly important part of 
                                                          
343 The polygamy cases, particularly those involving polygamous marriages performed abroad, 
also involve interesting issues along these lines.  American courts have tended to deal with the 
issue by refusing to recognition the validity of the marriage itself, but often implementing 
inheritance rights that depend on the marriage.  In objecting to polygamy, moreover, modern 
courts use secular rather than Christian justifications for asserting incompatibility with 
American law.  SEE LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE C. TEITELBAUM AND JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY 
LAW 187-90 (2005). 
344 See supra note __. 
345 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Casey). 
346 In this respect, we are persuaded by the extensive literature that locates the widespread 
opposition to Roe less in religious principles about the beginning of life, but in opposition to the 
creation of new understandings about family formation.  See Post and Siegel, supra note ___, 
Kristen Luker. The Politics of Motherhood, supra, __. 
347 Russell Shorts, Contra- Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, 6 (magazine), at 48  
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abortion jurisprudence.348  The fight for interstate recognition of same-sex 
adoption and parenting is already winning more battles than the fight for same-
sex marriage,349 in part because it is a less direct and confrontational fight, and 
in part because it draws on the strengths of our federalist system.  In similar 
fashion, where values conflicts threaten to undermine judicial legitimacy, 
decisions that use procedural devices to avoid judgment on controversial issues 
may command greater support.  The Alabama decisions that emphasized 
deference to trial court findings of fact provided a way to diffuse irreconcilable 
conflict on the source of custody decision-making. 350 
 
Finally, in the face of irreconcilable differences, silence may sometimes 
be the better course.  Legislatures, for example, have largely chosen not to 
regulate assisted reproduction, and, indeed, a third of state legislatures have yet 
to address the less controversial issue of paternity in the context of artificial 
insemination by donor.351  The Supreme Court, which only rarely hears family 
law cases in any event, has not granted certiorari on the host of parental rights 
cases that have arisen since its 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville.352 
 
Nonetheless, the courts should seize opportunities to crystallize a moral 
shift capable of commanding broad acceptance.  The courts in Oklahoma, 
Mississippi, Illinois, Georgia and Rhode Island have each used the common law 
process to recognize the change from per se condemnation of non-marital 
cohabitation to closer exploration of the nexus between sexual activity and 
parenting.  These decisions may have taken place at different times in different 
contexts in different states, but in each case the decisions reflected a change in 
approach that synthesized a gradual evolution in sensibilities. 
 
The role of the courts in mediating values conflicts can be instrumental 
in expressing the common ground underlying seeming conflicts.  Case-by-case 
decision-making that can be tailored to the facts at hand is often less divisive 
than broader pronouncements of legislation or morality.  Family law has become 
a situs for fundamental moral change, and the integrity of the courts an 
important instrument in values formation. The courts have historically played 
the midwife role to cultural change in other contexts, and they have begun to 
play that role in working through the minefield of non-marital sexuality.  They 
cannot do so, however, when caught in a culture war that sees judicial outcomes 
as exercises of power in which one ideological side "wins" over the other. 
                                                          
348 See SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, GENDER, ABORTION, AND TRAVEL AFTER 
ROE'S END, 51 St. Louis L.J. 655 (2007); Teresa Collett Stanton, supra.  
349 See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. App. 2006) (reversing lower court 
refusal to recognize parenting status based on Vermont civil union on jurisdictional grounds); 
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18500 (10th Cir. August 3, 2007)(holding that 
Oklahoma must give full faith and credit to adoptions by same-sex parents in other states). 
350 See supra notes __. 
351  NAOMI CAHN, THE PARENT PLAN (forthcoming 2008). 
352 Troxel v. Granville, 528 U.S. 1151 (2000). 
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58% 359   
  Alabama r X   S 98 15 30 4.9 58% 
Alaskar ▼   Broad S 97, 
C 98 
30 35 4.3 Not avail. 
Arizona r X   S 96 2 19 4.2 35% 
Arkansas r X   Broad s ‘97, 
C ‘98 
10 41 6.1 55% 
California ▼   S 00 7 5 -- 32% 
Colorado r  X  S 00 22 21 4.4 35% 
Connecticut   X  33 9 3.1 37% 
Delaware  X*360  S 96 11 8 3.7 43% 
DC   X  na na 1.9 33% 
Florida r  X  Broad S 97 6 7 4.8  
Georgia r  X  Broad C 04, 
S 96, 
8 22 -- 52% 
Hawaii   X S 98 12 6 --  
Idaho r §   S 96 37 45 5.0 43% 
Illinois  ▼  S 96 20 10 2.6 42% 
Indiana r  X   S 97 31 38 -- 46% 
Iowa  X  S 98 43 42 2.8 46% 
Kansas r  X  S 96 34 39 3.3 47% 
                                                          
353 Red indicates that George W. Bush won the state in the 2004 presidential election; Blue 
indicates that John Kerry won the state in the 2004 presidential election. 
354 Except where indicated, parental involvement laws in minors’ abortions require the 
involvement of one parent and apply to minors under 18. 
355 Based on  National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (2005), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf. 
S refers to a statute; C refers to a constitutional amendment; broad refers to ban on other 
forms of patnerhip recognition, other than the “basic” ban on same-sex marriage. 
356 Ranking by rates of pregnancy per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of 
residence, 2000. 
357 Ranking by rates of abortion per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of 
residence, 2000. 
358 Divorce rates are based on provisional counts of divorces by state of occurrence.  Rates 
are per 1,000 total population residing in area.  Includes annulments.  Includes divorce 
petitions filed or legal separations for some counties or States. 
359 Church or Synagogue Attendance by State, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2006.  The 
national average is 42% or people who say they attend a church or synagogue either once a 
week or almost once per week.  There are no blue states in the top 15, and only one red state 
in the bottom 15. 
360 Law applies to women under 16 
 68 RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 
       _____________________________________________________________ 
Kentucky r X   Broad C 04, 
S 98 
25 47 4.9 48% 
Louisiana r X    Broad C 04, 
S 99 
19 44 -- 58% 
Maine   X S 97 46 31 4.3 31% 
Maryland  X*   13 3 3.2 41% 
Massachusetts X    40 11 2.2 31% 
Michigan X   Broad C 04, 
S 96 
27 15 3.4  
Minnesota  Both parents  S 97 47 36 2.8 44% 
Mississippi r Both 
parents 
  S 97, C 04 3 28 4.5 57% 
Missouri r X   S 96, C 04 29 34 3.8 46% 
Montana r  ▼  Broad S 97, 
C 04 
38 32 3.8 34% 
Nebraska r  X  Broad 00 41 40 3.4 53% 
Nevada r  ▼  C 02 1 4 6.4 27% 
New 
Hampshire 
 ▼  S 04 48 25 3.9 24% 
New Jersey  ▼   16 1 3.0 34% 
New Mexico r ▼    4 18 4.6 41% 
New York   X  14 2 3.0 33% 
North 
Carolina r 





  Broad C 04, 
S 97 
50 48 3.1 43% 
Ohio r X   Broad C & 
S 04 
28 27 3.6 43% 
Oklahoma r  X  Broad C 04, 
S 96 
21 37 4.9 50% 
Oregon   X C 04 23 13 4.1 32% 
Pennsylvania X   S 96 39 23 3.0 43% 
Rhode Island X    36 16 3.0 Not avail. 
South 
Carolina r 
X361   S 96 17 24 3.2 58% 
South Dakota 
r 
 X  S 96 44 49 3.1 45% 
Tennessee r X   S 96 18 29 4.9 52% 
Texas r X   Broad S 03 
& C 05 
5 26 3.6 49% 
Utah r  X  Broad C 04 45 50 4.1 55% 
Vermont   X  49 33 3.9 24% 
Virginia r X   Broad S 04, 
S 97 
32 20 3.9 44% 
Washington   X S 98 26 12 4.3 32% 
West Virginia 
r 
 X*  S 00 35 46 5.0 46% 
Wisconsin X*    42 43 3.0 43% 
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Wyoming r X    24 14 5.2 36% 
Total 25 18 7 + 
DC 
    
 
▼ Enforcement permanently enjoined by court order; policy not in effect. 
§ Temporarily blocked by court order; policy not in effect. 
* Allows specified health professionals to waive parental involvement if judge is unavailable. 
˜ Physicians may, but is not required to, inform the minor’s parent 
 
